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ABTRACT:
One of the negative consequences of the Industrial Revolution in the United States is that
numerous sites that once housed heavy industry now lie fallow. Investors have avoided such
sites for fear of exposing themselves to the "strict" and "joint and several" environmental
liability under CERCLA legislation. However, new government programs established to
correct the "brownfields" problem have begun to attract private capital and renewed interest in
brownfields redevelopment.
The ability of private capital to flow into brownfields is contingent on the mechanisms
available to the participants to distribute the environmental risk and reward of the project.
This thesis explores how private market investors analyze and distribute these risks through a
close examination of the documents utilized for two such projects. The research has been
conducted as part of a larger study in which a total of six case studies have been investigated.
All six cases will be utilized in the final chapter.
The first case study involves the remediation and redevelopment of a former oil tank farm into
a residential subdivision. The site had been contaminated by the U.S. Navy, and was partially
being remediated by the Department of Defense. This case provides a good example of how a
buyer can utilize non-recourse, seller financing and a state voluntary program to protect its
interests throughout the project.
The second case looks at the acquisition of an office portfolio by a REIT. This portfolio
included an undeveloped parcel of land that had been contaminated by an adjacent site. To
provide the funds necessary for the remediation of the parcel, the buyer required the seller to
set aside proceeds from the sale. By establishing the escrow account, the REIT eliminated the
risk of the Seller dissolving after the sale. Furthermore, since it utilized the state voluntary
remediation program, the REIT had a defined standard of remediation required that would cap
its future liability.
The cases offer four principal lessons: 1) government agencies can assist private investors get
past many major hurdles; 2) although environmental insurance is a tremendous risk sharing
mechanism, it is currently not being utilized in a significant way; 3) state voluntary programs
are being utilized by most investors; and 4) deep-pocketed principals need to retain control of
the remediation process.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence S. Bacow
Title: Professor of Law and Environmental Policy
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CHAPTER 1
Brownfields
Introduction
One of the negative consequences of the Industrial Revolution in the United States is
that numerous sites that once housed heavy industry now lie fallow. Given the terrible
financial condition of many of the Nation's older cities and suburbs, these "brownfields"
represent an intolerable waste of valuable resources. "Brownfields are defined as previously
occupied industrial sites that are contaminated or thought likely to be contaminated and are
currently vacant or underused." Many of these sites became contaminated when operators
were ignorant or less vigilant concerning the proper disposal of industrial by-products.
According to Environmental Warranty, a Connecticut-based company that insures against
unexpected environmental cleanup costs, approximately 450,000 properties nationwide are
either contaminated or suspected of being contaminated.2 Furthermore, it is estimated that the
cost of remediating these sites will total $650 billion.
Since these sites do not produce taxes or economic goods (e.g., employment, products,
etc.), all levels of government are interested in solving this problem. By initiating brownfield
redevelopment, public agencies can create new sources of employment, prevent "clean" sites
or so-called "greenfields" from being developed, and increase future property and income tax
revenues.
Government Response
In order to deal with this ever-growing problem, the federal government enacted the
Chalmers, James and Thomas Jackson. "Risk Factors in the Appraisal of Contaminated Properties," The
Appraisal Journal, January 1996, page 57.
2 Allen, Scott. "Waste sites now paying dividends," The Boston Globe, 16 November 1996, page Al.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or
Superfund) in 1980. With this legislation came the obligation of current and previous owners
to clean the contaminated sites. Under CERCLA, liability is strict (e.g., without regard to
fault) and is applied "jointly" and "severally." Therefore, it reaches beyond the "responsible
parties" and effectively includes all owners who are in the chain of title. Although there have
been stories of start-up companies and innocent operators being sued for millions of dollars of
remediation costs, typically the government pursues larger, deep-pocketed firms and
responsible parties.
Furthermore, although the language of CERCLA protects lenders who hold security
interests in contaminated properties, judicial interpretation has varied. In United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp. , the court broke with existing precedent and held that a secured creditor
could be liable under CERCLA if its involvement was sufficiently broad enough to affect
hazardous waste disposal decisions. This 1990 judicial decision sent shock waves through the
lending community.4 The uncertainty of liability combined with the difficulty in raising
capital for these contaminated properties has caused many sites to remain vacant and
unproductive.
Over the past few years there have been a number of programs established to address
the brownfields problem. "The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).. .is supporting
brownfields pilot projects that are allowing local governments to experiment with funding,
cleanup, and public involvement scenarios." 5 By 1995, the EPA had 50 pilot demonstration
programs in effect nationwide. Through the end of 1996, the EPA had issued 78 project
3 United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F. 2d 1550.
grants worth over $13 million.6 These pilot projects have attempted to motivate individual
states to initiate their own brownfield redevelopment programs. Furthermore, the EPA has
taken steps to offer liability protection to new owners (so-called prospective purchasers) and
has issued a policy that clearly delineates the parameters for lender liability (so-called "bright
line" test).7
Unfortunately, regardless of the public good to be achieved, any significant level of
brownfields redevelopment can only occur with the involvement of the private sector. Private
capital will invest in brownfields if the risks associated with the investment are commensurate
with the project's overall return.
In the last few years, a number of joint ventures between real estate and environmental
firms have been created to capitalize on the anticipated high returns from brownfields
investing. These teams are created to buy distressed properties at a discount, remediate them,
and develop or sell them at a profit. This recent flurry of private sector activity suggests that
significant arbitrage opportunities may exist in the redevelopment of brownfields.
Recent Stimuli
Essentially three catalysts can stimulate investment in brownfields: decreased costs,
decreased risks, or increased returns. Currently, advancement in all three categories has taken
place in both the public and the private sector.
Second only to litigation expense, remediation costs can be a brownfields "deal
4 Bartsch, Charles and Elizabeth Collaton. Brownfields - Cleaning and Reusing Contaminated Properties.
(Washington, D.C.: Northeast-Midwest Institute, 1997).
5 Ibid.
6 Wright, Andrew and Andrew Roe. "Brownfield Cleanups Debug Development," Engineering News -
Record, April 28, 1997, page 34.
7 Diamond, Bruce. "Opportunities in Brownfields," Mortgage Banking, July 1996, page 90.
breaker." Minimizing the expense of site remediation has been realized recently through
legislation and technology. One such piece of legislation is the Risk Based Corrective Action
(RBCA). This legislation, commonly referred to as the Rebecca Laws, allows for the
remediation of a contaminated site to be custom fit for its proposed redeveloped use. For
example, if the site will be used as a retail center at completion, the level of remediation will
not have to reach that of a proposed residential housing development. By setting the
appropriate level of remediation to the project's end use, the remediation costs can be lowered
in most cases.
Recent technological advances in the environmental remediation field have led to
more efficient remediation tactics and thus lower cleanup costs for brownfield investors. In
Italy's northern Po Valley, about 35 kilometers west of Milan, engineers used a four-pronged
approach for the cleanup of a devastating oil spill. When a major oil well exploded in 1994,
this farm community was covered by millions of gallons of crude oil over a range of five
square miles. Many of the tactics used, such as in situ "landfarming" and biopiles8 , helped to
fast-track the cleanup efforts and return more than 90% of the tainted fields back to the
farmers in time for the 1995 spring planting.9 Although most brownfields do not require such
advanced bioremediation approaches, the lessons learned from these projects will help
engineers understand how to remediate other brownfields in a thorough and efficient manner.
Environmental insurance can play a significant role in the redevelopment and
transferability of contaminated properties. Environmental insurance policies can be utilized to
lower a project's risk by capping the cost of site remediation. By doing so, a portion of the
project's risk is parceled out to another player (e.g., insurer) for a fee. In addition, an investor
can purchase a policy that will protect against future liability. Johnson and Higgins, an
insurance-brokerage and risk management firm based in New York, offers a single policy for
all parties involved in a brownfields redevelopment. This "dirty wrap-up" coverage gives the
developer more control over the project and typically lowers the overall cost of environmental
insurance for the entire project.
According to Charles Perry, founder of Environmental Warranty Inc. of West
Hartford, Connecticut, "the price of environmental insurance has dropped at least 75% over
the last four years, largely because true cleanup costs often come in below what people fear."' 0
In addition, the use of environmental insurance can be used to ease the fears of a potential
buyer. " In one such deal, Perry's firm issued an environmental insurance policy in favor of
the buyer. The buyer accepted this policy in place of an environmental indemnification from
the seller, and the sales price was discounted by the price of the coverage.
Further advancement in decreasing the risks associated with the redevelopment of
brownfields has been achieved at the state level. For example, many states currently have
their own voluntary cleanup programs. "Voluntary cleanup laws are one of the most prevalent
regulatory changes speeding along brownfields redevelopment where enforcement programs
have failed."12 These programs allow parties to initiate site remediation under state cleanup
8 In situ "landfarming" utilized the local farmers to aerate and fertilize the soil. This process provided
much needed nutrients and oxygen to the bioremediation activity. Biopiles are mounds of soil with layers
of piping that allow for tight control of critical moisture, oxygen, nutrients and temperature.
9 Rubin, Debra. "Bugs Feast in Italy," Engineering News - Record, April 28, 1997, page 46.
10 Allen, Scott.
" Sheridan, Mike. "How is the Real Estate Industry winning the Brownfields Battle?" National Real Estate
Investor, August 1996, page 72.
12 Author unknown. "States take the lead in Brownfields," Environmental Business Journal, February
1997, page 4.
standards. Upon completion of remediation, most states typically issue a "No Further Action"
letter that can lead to a "Certificate of Completion." Massachusetts privatizes its cleanup
program by requiring the parties to hire an independent site cleanup professional. This
professional oversees the site remediation and issues a "No Further Action" letter to the
investor upon completion. The state is notified throughout the project by the independent
professional regarding the project's status.' 3
A "No Further Action" letter and a "Certificate of Completion" however do have their
limitations. For example, they do not protect past owner/operators of the property, only the
party who initiated the remediation and all future owner/operators. Furthermore, because the
state government issued the "No Further Action" letter and the "Certificate of Completion,"
they do not provide liability protection from the federal government or third-party suits under
federal environmental laws. To address this concern, the EPA has stated publicly its intention
not to interfere at sites that are participating in state voluntary cleanup programs. The regional
offices of the EPA have begun issuing "comfort language" in their Memoranda of Agreement
with states that have achieved a level of proficiency in overseeing site remediation programs.14
The final catalyst for increased brownfields redevelopment is higher financial returns.
Increased returns can be achieved through many new federal, state, and local programs that
are created to be brownfields redevelopment initiatives: tax credits, grants, public-sector
funds, tax abatements, empowerment zones, etc. In addition, the issue of whether remediation
costs can be deducted or must be capitalized has been at the forefront of many Internal
Revenue Service and Congressional discussions. Assuming that pending legislation passes in
13 Bartsch, Charles.
favor of remediation cost deductions, the resulting increases in investor yields will initiate a
boon of new brownfields redevelopment.
Risks
All real estate development transactions entail risk. These typically include:
" Approval risk - the risk that the project will not receive the public approvals
necessary to commence construction and occupancy;
* Construction risk - the risk that the project will not be built on budget or on time;
* Interest rate risk - the risk that interest rates will rise during the construction and
lease-up period in excess of budget thus necessitating infusion of additional
capital;
* Market risk - the risk that the project will not generate the expected cash flows in
the marketplace either due to slower than expected lease-up or sale, or due to
lower than expected rents or sales prices;
* Operating risks - the risk that the cost of operating the project once constructed
will be in excess of budget.
In addition to the above, brownfields entail special risks. For example, investors in a
brownfield project face risks of future environmental liability that are typically far greater than
encountered in the development of "greenfields." Similarly, one of the operating risks
incurred by brownfield investors is the risk of future remediation costs either due to discovery
of additional wastes on site, or due to adoption of more stringent future regulations. Finally,
investors in a brownfields redevelopment face different market risks. Will the stigma of the
past environmental problems cause the property to trade at a discount? Are tenants willing to
locate their operations on sites with troubled environmental histories?
Investor Motivation
1 Pepper, Edith M. Lessons from the Field - Unlocking Economic Potential with an Environmental Key.
(Washington, D.C.: Northeast-Midwest Institute, 1997).
Given the barriers to brownfield redevelopment posed by the above risks and costs,
these projects require the involvement of a broader range of investors than traditional
development projects. Investors in this context include all parties who are making a financial
investment in the site. These include equity investors, holders of debt, insurers, remediation
and general contractors, tenants, and in many cases, public entities that are bearing part of the
cost of cleanup or redevelopment.
One positive aspect of involving a myriad of investors into a brownfields project is
that each investor has a different method of evaluating the specific components of risk
involved in the deal and a different level of tolerance for such risk. As such, there might be a
way to parcel out the pieces to those who are willing to assume the risk for the lowest return
and therefore pay the highest price. The late William Zeckendorf, a highly successful real
estate investor, used to refer to this method as the Hawaiian Technique. By selling the
component of the project to the investor who understands the risks best, the promoter or lead
investor can generate the highest value for the project.
When assembling a team to conduct brownfields redevelopment, one has the option of
creating this team internally or externally. As mentioned earlier, a number ofjoint ventures
between real estate and environmental firms have been created. By bringing all of the experts
together, these firms believe they will be best suited to capitalize on the flurry of brownfields
activity. However, by putting together the right team of professionals, any real estate
investment firm can participate in these deals. As long as there is a clearly defined process
and end use, most firms will be able to participate in the future of brownfields redevelopment.
Methodology
As one member of a three-student team, we propose to undertake a series of case
studies of brownfields redevelopment.' 5 The purpose of these case studies is to understand
how the financial structures employed by the principals allocate the risks and rewards
associated with these transactions. These instruments include partnership and joint venture
agreements, incorporation documents, purchase and sale agreements, option agreements,
mortgages and other debt instruments, remediation contracts, indemnification agreements,
leases, and insurance. In addition, we will also be evaluating the impact of any legislative
initiatives designed to address the risks assumed by new investors.
The case studies that will be used for this thesis must meet certain criteria. For this
particular paper we are interested mainly in brownfields, not the heavily contaminated
Superfund sites. The project must have reached the point where all essential documents have
been negotiated and signed. Although we are not requiring that remediation work and
construction have begun, it is necessary to have the project permitted and financed. By
requiring our case studies to fall within these guidelines, we can isolate our research and
inquiries through the finalized documents.
Due to the sensitive nature of many brownfields projects, it was necessary to mask
some of the case studies to protect the identity of the principals and the project's location. The
disguise was handled in one of two different ways. In some instances, the names and
locations were changed to different ones. In other cases, no name was used to describe the
principals and locations.
In the final chapter, we will pull together the lessons learned through all of the case
15 The first two case studies which are discussed in the final chapter are from "Risk Sharing in Brownfields
Redevelopment: a case study approach," a 1997 Master Thesis of the MIT Center for Real Estate authored
by John M. Evans. The latter two were authored by Shaun Ryan and are presented in "Brownfields
Development," a 1997 Master Thesis of the MIT Center for Real Estate.
studies. The collection of these cases should provide for appropriate comparisons and
contrasts. Of the six case studies conducted, we encountered four different states, four
different end uses (e.g., industrial, office, recreational, and residential), and principals in many
different forms (e.g., government, private, public REIT).
Relevance
Most of the work to date on brownfields has ignored the financial dimensions of these
transactions. From the public sector's perspective, much of the interest in redeveloping
brownfields stems from a number of objectives including reclaiming dirty sites, protecting
greenfields from development, creating jobs and tax revenues in blighted areas, and
stimulating additional development through brownfield reclamation. Unfortunately, this
agenda does not always dovetail with the agenda of the private sector, which typically view
brownfields as a development opportunity to be evaluated in terms of risk and reward. It is
important to reiterate that private capital will only invest in brownfields if the risks associated
with the investments are justified by the potential financial rewards.
The purpose of the proposed research is to better inform our understanding of how the
various actors in the brownfield redevelopment process, assess, and evaluate the risks
associated with these investments. By examining the financial documents used to allocate
these risks, we hope to understand how public policy might be crafted to stimulate more
brownfields redevelopment in the future.
CHAPTER 2
Risk Sharing Mechanisms
Through a series of bilateral and multi-lateral agreements, the many parties in a real
estate development project determine how risk and reward will be parceled out during the
project's life. This is of major concern to parties involved in a project with past environmental
problems. By describing each document and relationship, this chapter will establish a
framework by which brownfields development can be viewed. Particular emphasis will focus
on what opportunities are available to the individual parties at each particular stage of
negotiation. It is this lens that we will use to examine the case studies in the next two chapters.
Site Control
One of the first issues encountered in a potential real estate development is how to
gain control of a property. Site control is achieved through contracts between the developer
and the landowner (e.g., purchase and sale, option to purchase, land lease, etc.) A contract is
fundamentally a legally enforceable agreement between two (or more) parties concerning their
future actions. 16 All contracts involve three distinct steps. First, there must be an offer. Next,
there must be an acceptance. Finally, the basic element of a legally enforceable contract is
consideration. Each party must give something of value.
The most common contract used to acquire a piece of property is the purchase and sale
agreement (P&S). The P&S serves many purposes. First and foremost, it clearly states the
business deal between the buyer and the seller. Second, it provides enough detail as to lower
the risk of a misunderstanding. Next, it defines the contingencies, obligations to close, and
what happens if the deal dies. Finally, the purchase and sale agreement sets forth what
obligations, if any, will survive the closing.17
Negotiating the P&S for a site with a history of environmental problems is particularly
important. Besides stating the typical aspects of a real estate transaction such as the price and
the obligations to close, the P&S for a brownfield site entails many more details. Since
signing the P&S will place the buyer within the property's title chain, the buyer must be very
diligent during the structuring and negotiating of the contract. This negotiation and the
resulting documents will outline which party is responsible for the current remediation work.
The document will also define continuing obligations for both the buyer and the seller. In
theory, the P&S negotiation allows the investor to negotiate all aspects of the deal before any
substantial investment is made. If the investor cannot limit the project's risk to justify the
return on investment, the deal will not be undertaken.
Although the P&S is very common, there are many contracts which either replace the
P&S or are used before the parties are ready to enter the P&S stage. For example, an option
enables an investor to control a piece of property for a period of time without committing to
ownership. During this period, the holder of the option can secure financing, obtain tenants or
begin the entitlement process. The option holder typically pays a fixed amount of
compensation to the property owner and agrees to pay some predetermined amount for the
property at the end of the option period. The holder also has the option of walking away from
the deal at the end of the option period and may forfeit the option price to the property owner.
This strategy allows a developer to eliminate some of the development risk (e.g., financing,
16 Smith, Douglas. "Note on Contracts," Legal Issues in the Development Process. (Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 1996).
marketing, and permitting) before committing great amounts of resources to the project.
In addition to capping the development risk, an option also serves to protect the
investor in the early stages of a project. By avoiding the "chain of title," the investor can
avoid any and all liability associated with the site until the project risks are quantified. There
are two ways an investor can avoid being caught in the title chain while the site is
contaminated. One way is by utilizing a contract for sale that is conditional upon the seller
completing full remediation of the site. A second way is to purchase an option. The option
will only be exercised if the seller has remediated the site to the satisfaction of the buyer. In
the latter case, the holder of the option should receive back from the seller an agreement to
remediate the site.
Another tool available to the developer is a land or ground lease. With a ground lease
secured, a developer controls the site for the term of the lease. Typically, the land and all
improvements revert back to the landowner at the end of the ground lease. This enables the
developer to avoid large outlays of capital at the beginning of project. Instead, the developer
will make steady payments to the landowner over the life of the ground lease.
Ground leases are not very common in brownfields transactions. Typically, private
parties who want to sell their contaminated sites want to do so as a fee simple transaction.' 8
Furthermore, investors are not willing to enter into a deal in which they take all of the
remediation risk and the landowner reaps all of the upside at the end of the lease term.
However, land leases of formerly contaminated properties do occur between end users and
government entities. Connecticut's Department of Economic Development (DED)
17 Mack, Robert W. Esq. See generally "Negotiating and Drafting the Purchase and Sale Agreement."
18 Fee simple refers to the sale of the land, building and all encumbrances.
categorizes their site cleanups in three groups. One such group, Type III, refers to sites that
can be purchased by the state, remediated to acceptable levels, and leased to tenants. The
DED uses the lease payments to fund the remediation work.
Government Agencies
The parties involved in brownfields redevelopment will have a great deal of
interaction with the federal government (Environmental Protection Agency or EPA) and the
state government (usually the Department of Environmental Protection or DEP). Investors in
brownfields will most likely be exposed to the Prospective Purchaser Agreement (PPA). This
document, which is issued by the EPA, establishes the agreement between the EPA and the
investor as to how much site remediation will be required to receive "Covenants Not to Sue"
from the federal government. If the site is remediated to the standards requested, the party
will receive "Covenants Not to Sue" which cover all future owners and operators of the site.
In dealing with the DEP, an investor may decide to cleanup the site under a state's
voluntary remediation program. As mentioned in Chapter 1, these programs allow any party
(e.g., lender, fiduciary, owner, operator, buyer, etc.) to submit environmental site assessments
and remediation plans to the DEP for review. Since the level of cleanup required is handled
on a case by case basis, there is opportunity for a brownfields investor to negotiate a creative
remediation plan. Utilizing the new requirements of the Risk Based Corrective Action
program, an investor has some leeway as to what level of remediation is required depending
on the site's future use.
Entitlement Process
In most parts of the world, landowners hold their land subject to regulation by the
state. Zoning attempts to cluster uses together and essentially bans certain types of
development from occurring in specific areas. Zoning also regulates the density of proposed
real estate developments. However, because virtually all zoning schemes provide for
exceptions to the general plan, the developer must be familiar with the local zoning laws and
the public approval process. Through this process, the developer can try to obtain a variance,
special permit, or zoning change in order to build something other than what is allowed by the
"as of right" zoning laws.
Brownfield investors have an opportunity early in a project's life to work with the
local municipality to obtain necessary permits for their proposed project. Many local
governments may include the entitlements in a brownfields "initiative" package as an
additional incentive to redevelop brownfields. Under this scenario, the investor can lower the
project's risk, shorten the entitlement process, and gain local support before any substantial
outlays of capital take place. The decreased risk, time, and opposition should result in
improved financial results and an increase in brownfields redevelopment.
Entity Agreement
A real estate investor or developer can take title to a piece of property in a myriad of
ways. Some of these options include taking title as an individual, through a partnership, a
limited partnership, a limited liability company, a corporation, a trust, or a REIT. Each form
has its pros and cons and the developer's lawyer, accountant and financial planner should all
be consulted on this decision. In the context of this thesis, it is the terms of the agreement that
matter more so than the form of the entity.
The importance of the entity agreement is that it specifies how much control and
liability each party holds in a particular project. In addition, the entity agreement typically
spells out how the rewards of a particular project will be parceled out during the life of the
investment. If a deal were structured as a limited partnership, the limited partnership
agreement would differentiate between the risks borne by the general partner and those by the
limited partners. The agreement would detail how much capital each party has placed at risk
and how the party will be rewarded for making the investment.
However, the entity agreement does more than just explain how the risks and rewards
will be distributed to the numerous investors. More importantly, the agreement can be used to
isolate new capital from the risks of environmental liability. This is vital to the future of
brownfields redevelopment. In order to attract sophisticated equity capital, the investment's
promoters need to offer their investors high returns and limited liability. At the outset of the
project, the participants must decide who will manage the investment and who will have
limited management input. It is during the negotiating phase of the entity agreement that these
and other vital details will be decided upon.
Financing
"According to the FDIC, loan documents should include language to safeguard
lenders against potential environmental losses and liabilities. In light of this guidance, a
growing number of lenders insist that they be indemnified by the borrower and any guarantors
against liability associated with the collateral."' 9 Unfortunately for the lender, warranties and
indemnifications are only as strong as the financial strength of the borrower. Therefore, it is
the lender's responsibility to fully understand the risks of a particular project. To do this, the
lender should require a "right of access" in the mortgage documents. "The FDIC states that
borrowers should be monitored during the life of the loan, as ongoing environmental risk
assessments are important to make sure the property used as collateral remains
uncontaminated and retains its value."20 Monitoring of the property is not considered to be
"participating in management" under the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit
Insurance Protection Act of 1996.
In addition, lenders are concerned with the ability of the developer to complete the
project. Since the redevelopment of an environmentally contaminated property entails many
more risks than the development of a pristine site, the lender must be comfortable with the
borrower's ability. This is where a joint venture between a real estate developer and an
environmental engineer can add tremendous value.
From the borrower's perspective, only non-recourse financing is attractive. With non-
recourse financing, the lender can only use the specific property to satisfy unpaid debt. The
lender has no recourse against the borrower or the borrower's other assets in case of loan
default. This allows the borrower to walk away from projects that are no longer financially
feasible. Although non-recourse debt is extremely common in commercial real estate
investments, a brownfields lender will be concerned given the nature of the project's
environmental contamination. However, a lender may grant a non-recourse loan if the
borrower has a healthy balance sheet and agrees to provide a personal guarantee regarding the
remediation of the contamination.
Since sellers of contaminated properties do not have a large pool of buyers at their
disposal, they might have to sweeten the offer by providing seller financing. From the buyer's
perspective, the purchase money mortgage will lower their initial required investment, thus
'9 Bartsch, Charles.
20 Ibid.
21 Abelson, H. Edward. "Reducing the Liability Risks for Polluted-Property Lenders," Banker &
Tradesman, 30 June 1997, page B13.
improving the project's financial performance. 2 2 Also, if this financing is "packaged" with
the purchase of the brownfield, the buyer can avoid spending the time required to obtain
financing for the project. A whole layer of risk - financing risk - is eliminated from the
beginning. In addition, the seller might understand the level of contamination at the site better
than an outside lender would. This would allow the seller to quantify the true risks of the deal
easier than an outside lender. However, as with all real estate lending, the risk to the seller is
that the buyer could default on the note. Under this scenario, the seller must be willing and
able to take back the property and its environmental problems.
By securing a major, investment grade tenant for the project up front, a developer can
ease the worries of a lender considerably. The lease will essentially shift the burden of paying
debt service from the borrower to the tenant. In addition, the lender has reduced its risk
through the strong credit of the pre-leased tenant.
One major problem "with respect to financing remediation and redevelopment of
brownfields, [is that] property appraisers in the United States have been generally reluctant to
provide valuations of unremediated brownfields. Without property appraisals, lenders are
unable to determine a property value for the loan-to-value ratio; therefore, any lending that
takes place is usually based on a very low value, requiring more developer equity."23 Many
real estate investors are lobbying to have appraisals of contaminated properties based on
remediated values, even before the remediation begins. That would allow an investor to
borrow funds for the acquisition and remediation against the future value of the remediated
property.
22 Seller financing is commonly referred to as a purchase money mortgage.
Remediation Contract
The parties involved in the site remediation (e.g., seller, buyer, government agency,
environmental engineer, remediation contractor, etc.) have tremendous flexibility during the
negotiating and structuring period for the remediation contract. It is during this time that the
parties will determine who will bear what risks and who will receive what rewards. For
example, a great emphasis during the negotiations will focus on who is responsible for excess
cleanup costs, if any. The contract might specify a ceiling on remediation costs thus shifting
the risk to the remediation contractor. If the buyer or seller is experienced in the
redevelopment of brownfields, the risk of excess cleanup costs might be borne by that party.
Every deal is unique and every player brings different skills to the table. One of the primary
drivers of the recent joint ventures between real estate investment firms and remediation
engineers is to build a team that can understand what environmental risks are inherent in the
deal and then price those risks accordingly.
The party that does assume the risk also has the opportunity to purchase an
environmental insurance policy that would shift the remediation risk to the policyholder. As
mentioned earlier, environmental insurance can play a significant role in the redevelopment
and transferability of contaminated properties. These policies can be utilized to lower a
project's risk by capping the cost of site remediation. By doing so, a portion of the project's
risk is parceled out to another player for a fee. In addition, an investor can purchase a policy
that will protect against future liability. It is important to remember that each time a party
shifts a certain risk to another, the former must compensate the latter for bearing the additional
risk.
23 Simons, Robert A. and Donald T. lannone. "Brownfields - Supply and Demand," Urban Land, June
Other variables that can be defined during remediation contract negotiations are the
types of performance guarantees that the contractor offers. For example, what constitutes full
performance under the contract? Who will determine the project's on-going level of
completion? If a problem arises in the future, which party will be responsible to handle the
remediation? If the contractor is responsible for future remediation, at what point will this
responsibility transfer back to the owner? Since the remediation contract is a vital component
of the proposed brownfield redevelopment, the negotiation stage is critical to the project's
success.
Leasing/Sale
Leases are used to detail the agreement between the owner and the end user. The
major concern of tenants who lease space in formerly contaminated property is one of liability.
Will the tenant be responsible for any future remediation work if they are not a "responsible
party?" The lease can render the tenant as an operator of the project during the life of its lease
if the tenant's actions contributed to site contamination. Since liability under current
CERCLA law is applied strict, joint, and several, "operators" can be placed in the path of
liability. In response to this, many sophisticated tenants have detailed questionnaires and
procedures in place that must be completed before a lease can be signed. There have been
cases where an operator protected itself from liability through the substantial due diligence
performed prior to signing the lease.
The tenant also wants assurances that its employees will not be harmed. For example,
if a site is remediated under the Rebecca Laws, there will still be slight levels of contamination
in the ground. Although these contaminants will be contained, the tenant may want to
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understand what levels and what types of contaminants are still in the ground. This is also
helpful if someone attempts to blame the tenant for future problems. The tenant will be able to
refer back to the lease or document that described the preexisting condition before the lease
began.
The lease also provides the landlord with an opportunity to limit its liability in the
future. By placing limits and restrictions on what a tenant can and cannot do on the site, the
landlord is proactively attempting to block future environmental problems. The landlord may
want personal guarantees from the tenant regarding future environmental contamination. If a
company has a strong track record and a healthy credit history, they will have an easier time
leasing space than will a start-up company.
Another issue arises when previously contaminated property is sold to an end user
(e.g., homeowner). When a land developer remediates a piece of property for a future
residential subdivision, there are many issues that must be addressed in the P&S between the
land developer and the buyer (e.g., homebuilder, homeowner, etc.) In order to prevent future
contamination at the site, a covenant of restrictions might have to be added to the deed. This
covenant could be used to prevent certain types of drilling for wells or driving of pylons, as
such activities could cause future leeching of controlled contaminants. The end user will also
be concerned with future contamination and future third party liability issues. If the site does
become contaminated at some time in the future, and the landowner is an innocent party, they
will want to understand what rights and remedies they have against the former owner.
Furthermore, if contaminants from their site leech into the water supply or onto someone
else's property, the homeowner will want to understand their responsibilities and recourse
against the former owners. Once again, the parties have many opportunities to address these
issues and many others during the document negotiations.
The cases that follow illustrate a variety of different strategies for addressing each of
the above concerns. The first case involves the remediation and redevelopment as a
residential subdivision of a former oil tank farm. The second case involves the acquisition of
an office portfolio by a REIT. The portfolio included an undeveloped parcel of land that had
been contaminated by an adjacent site. Whereas this chapter looks at how the documents
work in principal, the case studies will examine how the specific documents work in reality.
CHAPTER 3
Birch Island, Virginia
The true location and participants in this case study have been disguised.
Located on Chesapeake Bay just two miles from Norfolk, Birch Island established its
independence from Norfolk in 1992. Serviced by a year-round, state-run commuter ferry
service, islanders enjoy all of the benefits of living near a metropolitan area but come home to
a relaxed, friendly island setting. The location is surrounded by incredible panoramic ocean
views that according to its residents, "cannot be achieved anywhere on the mainland."
This case study involves a unique oceanfront property that encompasses
approximately one-fifth of Birch Island. In addition to a spectacular deepwater coastline, the
property contains the largest open meadow and fresh-water pond habitat in the Chesapeake
Bay Islands. Twenty-eight residential lots were created on approximately seventy-eight (78)
acres, half with direct water frontage. The remaining one hundred (100) acres became an
island park and conservation area in perpetuity.
The oceanfront parcels averaged three (3) acres in size with 105' to 240' of deepwater
frontage. The interior parcels were buildable with more than one-third of them having lovely
views toward the Norfolk skyline.
History
In 1944, the United States Navy converted a section of the Island into an oil tank farm
that would service naval vessels. The Navy operated this facility from 1944 to 1968
conducting terminal operations for No. 6 fuel oil, diesel oil, and gasoline. This location
provided shelter from the rough seas, deepwater piers for the vessels, and reinforced oil tanks
that could withstand enemy attacks. A total of fifteen oil tanks were constructed on the island
with a total capacity of over four million gallons. As a federally owned and operated site, the
location was exempt from local and state environmental regulation. Unfortunately, like many
of the country's military bases, this site was exposed to soil contamination. In 1969, the site
was sold to a private oil company, but the new owner did not reactivate the site.
Many years later, the property changed hands again. The new owner, another
privately owned oil firm, conducted storage and transfer operations from 1974 until 1981 for
No. 2 heating oil and diesel oil. In 1981, the owner decided to remove the site's wooden,
deepwater piers and replace them with steel piers. Unfortunately, the company did not obtain
necessary demolition and construction permits prior to removing the wooden piers. To its
dismay, the local permitting board refused to grant the new permits without the old piers being
intact. Having lost the "grandfather" status to build the new piers, the site could no longer
serve its original purpose. The facility has been mostly inactive since that time.
Upon removal of the piers, the property's "highest and best use" was no longer as an
oil tank farm. Had the property been a pristine "greenfield," most developers would have
sought to develop a waterfront residential project. The challenge for the current owner was to
find a developer who would understand the intricacies of a brownfield redevelopment and
would be willing to purchase this property.
The two cards that the owner held were that the United States government caused the
contamination and that the site would be extremely desirable after remediation due to its
tremendous oceanfront views. Furthermore, the Army Corp of Engineers ("Federal
Government") had already started remediation at the "Federal Areas"24 of the site through its
24 The "Federal Areas" refer to certain portions of the site that the Department of Defense has agreed to
assume responsibility and undertake remediation.
Defense and Environmental Restoration Program.25
Voluntary Response Action Program
Although the Federal Government and current owner had been working in conjunction
with the state Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for many years to obtain an
Order of Closure2 6, they were not utilizing the newly enacted voluntary response action
program. Like most state voluntary programs, this one allowed any party (e.g., lender,
fiduciary, owner, operator, buyer, etc.) to submit environmental site assessments and
voluntary response action plans (VRAP) to the DEP for review. Upon approval of the VRAP,
the DEP will issue a "No Action Assurance" letter, stating that if the plan is properly
implemented, the DEP will assure the parties no enforcement action will be taken.2 7
Following satisfactory completion of all remediation actions required in the plan, the
DEP would issue a "Certificate of Completion," acknowledging that the applicant has
satisfactorily completed the response action. The "Certificate of Completion" included the
applicable liability release provisions for either a complete or partial cleanup. The "Certificate
of Completion" generally applied to: the party responsible for implementing the cleanup work;
successors and assigns of the party implementing the plan; or lenders, fiduciaries and parties
providing financing to persons completing the work.
The idea behind the voluntary response action program is that a third party will be
granted protection from liability from the government if they: remediated a site to the
25 The Defense and Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) was established by the United States
Government to expedite remediation at former military facilities.
26 The "Order of Closure" is a detailed remediation plan approved by the DEP. A closure order is used
when underground oil storage facilities are involved.
27 The information regarding the state Voluntary Response Action Program was obtained from a document
compiled by the state Department of Environmental Protection. Due to the confidential nature of this case
study, the actual state and its DEP will not be mentioned by name.
satisfaction of the DEP; avoided perpetuating the contamination of the site by changing the
use; and avoided causing contamination on the site with the new use. For example, if a former
gas station is remediated to the satisfaction of the government agencies and the site is
converted into a bakery, the new operator should not be held responsible for past
contamination. All future liability to the state government remains with the former
owner/operators.
Limited Protection
Participants in brownfields redevelopment projects must remember that state
voluntary programs do not protect all parties from all risks. For example, the liability
protections received through these programs typically do not cover past owner/operators of the
site. If a seller is looking to forever be released from liability, the seller may have to "initiate"
the remediation process before transfer of the title occurs. Also, the release from liability
under these programs is limited to the satisfactory remediation of all known contamination at
the time the "Certificate of Completion" was issued. If the environmental engineers and
remediation contractors miss levels of contamination, the former owner/operators will not be
protected from the liability associated with this newly discovered contaminant.
Furthermore, the program only includes relevant provisions of state law; there is no
liability protection granted for applicable federal laws. However, as mentioned earlier, the
EPA has stated publicly its intention not to interfere at sites that are participating in state
voluntary cleanup programs. In addition, some states have reached a "memorandum of
agreement" or "memorandum of understanding" with the EPA. Since they have achieved a
level of proficiency in the eyes of the EPA, the EPA honors their "No Further Action" letters
at the federal level. This distinction can be vital to whether or not brownfields are
redeveloped, and will be revisited in the final chapter.
American Residential Corporation
Matthew O'Connor, President of American Residential Corporation, first heard about
this property through the residents of Birch Island. American had already developed
residential subdivisions on Birch Island, and O'Connor realized the huge potential of this site
as an oceanfront residential development. If American could understand and be shielded from
the environmental risks that this project carried, O'Connor would feel comfortable presenting
the investment to American's lenders and investors. Assuming the environmental risks of the
deal were mitigated, this project would be similar to other residential land developments that
American has completed.
Unlike the seller and the Department of Defense, O'Connor and his team of lawyers
and engineers understood the complexities of the voluntary response action program and
intended to utilize it for this project. The first problem that American encountered was their
weariness toward the prior environmental investigations. O'Connor was not satisfied with the
levels of remediation that were required under the proposed Closure Order between the DEP
and the seller. American had its engineers conduct additional environmental tests and found
higher levels of contamination. All additional discoveries were then added to the scope of the
Closure Order. Although the higher scope increased the remediation expense for both the
Seller and the Department of Defense, it also lowered the risk of future contamination
discoveries for both parties. This was important because both the Seller and the Department
of Defense had vast resources that were at risk due to the threat of future discoveries and/or
more stringent environmental legislation.
Early discussions with its attorneys provided American with some idea of the issues it
faced in the proposed residential development. Their lawyer identified three main issues:
" "Liability attaches to the owners of underground tanks and associated equipment,
not to the owners of real property. To the extent that we can structure the
transaction to exclude the tanks, with title taken only to the real estate,
accordingly, we can substantially insulate both American and any third party who
takes title from any possible liability;
* The DEP's approval of the closure plan and the work performed under it will be
reflected in a letter from them. Either in that letter or in another letter from the
DEP we should be able to obtain assurances that the property has been adequately
remediated and no further action is required. Under the recently enacted
Voluntary Response Action Plan (VRAP), a prospective purchaser can
expressly be relieved of any liability before purchase once a property has
been remediated. Some additional coordination will be required on this,
however, since the review of the closure is being handled by a different part of the
DEP than the group responsible for the VRAP; 28
* Finally, it would make sense to form an entity that has no assets and exists
solely for the purpose of owning the property. Although this would not be
necessary in the event we were able to exclude the tanks from the transfer, should
we be unable to do that, use of such an entity should provide some comfort as
well."
Unfortunately, American quickly realized that the seller would not sell the property
without including the tank farm. Therefore, American needed to structure the deal so that the
proposed residential subdivision would be shielded from the environmental liability that
would be attached to the oil tanks. This could be achieved by purchasing the entire property
and conveying the tank farm and surrounding area to a separate entity. This entity would
maintain the tank farm as a preservation or "Open Space" in perpetuity. Essentially, the
contaminated parcel would be remediated and converted into preservation land, and the
pristine land would be used for the residential parcels. Furthermore, it was expected that upon
completion of remediation work, the open space would be deeded to the Town of Birch
Island.
28 The emphasis in this paragraph, as well as those in the remaining pages, was added by the author.
Subsequent Purchaser Problems
Since American would not be the end user of the development, it faced considerable
marketing risk in this project. Although it took every precaution when structuring the deal and
would ensure that the site was properly remediated, nothing could guarantee a favorable
acceptance by the market. If the subsequent purchasers (lot buyers) were unwilling to live
within close approximation of a "formerly" contaminated oil tank farm, American's return on
investment could dwindle to unacceptable levels due to sales delays, lower than anticipated lot
prices, and unanticipated concession packages.
Over the past decade, the appraisal community has done considerable research in the
field of valuation for contaminated property and the effects of continued "stigma" after the site
has been remediated. Since value is determined by the end user, user concerns must be
translated into tangible costs. When trying to determine the value of a potential brownfields
redevelopment, "user concerns are treated as direct costs rather than as factors influencing the
cost of capital. For example, if health concems are associated with the property, users will
only be willing to offer a below-market rent. This will then be reflected in the cash flows
associated with the property rather than the capitalization rate." 29 American had to fully
understand the current residential market of Norfolk and Birch Island in order to determine
how the market would receive the newly created lots.
Since American had developed and sold residential lots on Birch Island in the past, it
believed that it understood the market. From past experience and studies American knew that
the demand for condominiums and clustered homes was very low. At this location, people
29 Chalmers, James and Thomas Jackson. "Risk Factors in the Appraisal of Contaminated Properties," The
Appraisal Journal, January 1996, page 49.
wanted a "piece of the rock." The buyers would want privacy and shore frontage.
American's biggest constraint was having enough soil for the septic systems. Each lot needed
enough "uplands" to support a house, a well, and a septic system. A large percentage of its
potential customers were residents of Birch Island, and they understood the levels of
contamination better than an outsider would have. However, due to the "stigma" associated
with the site, the lots were marketed at a discount. O'Connor estimated that the lots on Birch
Island were marketed for approximately thirty percent (30%) below the price of comparable,
ocean front product on the islands. It is also interesting to note that these lots could be
purchased for about one-third to one-half of the cost of comparable, oceanfront lots on the
mainland.
Another subsequent purchaser problem was the risk of future leeching of contaminants
onto abutting properties. Although the potential threat of such legal exposure is usually a deal
breaker, the future lot buyers in this case would not be liable to the DEP for such
contamination under the voluntary program. The Seller would be held accountable. Although
the Seller was protected under the VRAP for "known" contaminants that were remediated to
the satisfaction of the state, it was not protected from future discovery of contaminants that
were not covered under the voluntary program. Recently, additional contamination was
discovered on the site and the State has taken a strong position that American and the
subsequent owners were not responsible. The State is holding the previous owners
accountable for this remediation. The results of this first test of the VRAP on Birch Island are
very important. The action taken by the state solidifies the protections offered under the
voluntary program.
Purchase and Sale Agreement
American agreed to purchase the entire 176.84-acre site, including the tank farm for
three hundred fifty thousand dollars ($350,000) through the entity American Properties, Inc., a
Virginia corporation that was created solely for this transaction. The original intention of the
purchase and sale agreement (P&S) was for the property to be divided into two separate
parcels: one for the residential subdivision, and one for the open space preservation. One
condition that was included in the original P&S was that the open space parcel would be
conveyed to a separate buyer at the time of closing. This would allow American Properties,
Inc. to avoid ever taking title to the contaminated parcel. At the same time, American would
then transfer title of the residential parcel to Birch Island Residential Limited Partnership
(BIRLP).
The general partner of BIRLP was American of Birch Island, Inc. (ABI, Inc.) and the
limited partner was American Residential Development Fund Limited Partnership
(ARDFLP). It was determined from the limited partnership agreement that as general partner,
ABI, Inc. would hold a one percent (1%) partnership interest with a one hundred dollar ($100)
capital contribution. In addition, the limited partner, ARDFLP, would hold a ninety nine
percent (99%) partnership interest with a two hundred fifty thousand dollar ($250,000) capital
contribution. The thinly capitalized general partner seemed to fit into the framework
presented by American's lawyers ("...it would make sense to form an entity that has no assets
and exists solely for the purpose of owning the property.")
Some of the "conditions of purchase" in the initial purchase and sale agreement were
as follows:
1. "The right to secure approvals from the Town and all other applicable public
regulatory agencies for the subdivision of the property;
2. The Master Plan shall call for the site to be divided into two distinct parcels:
a "homesite" parcel and a "tank farm parcel;"
3. Soil, wetland, and hazardous materials evaluation studies shall have been
performed at Buyer's expense, with results that are satisfactory to Buyer;
4. Seller shall be in compliance with the Tank Farm closure plan submitted in 1988,
approved by the state DEP in 1990, and the property shall not be in recorded
violation of any State or Federal environmental regulation. It is understood and
agreed by Buyer and Seller that the remaining required closure of the Tank
Farm will be undertaken by the Federal Government and that such closure
activities may occur after the closing;"
The risk in the aforementioned condition was that the Federal Government could fail
to perform its remediation duties. If the Federal Government abandoned the project before it
was completed, who would be responsible for the cost and performance of final remediation?
The agreements between the State DEP and the Department of Defense (DoD) were so
specific that American believed there was no way the State could ever force them or the prior
owners (oil companies) to perform the work which was the responsibility of the DoD. There
was essentially no risk of nonperformance because the Federal Government had contractually
agreed to complete the remediation work. However, if a problem did arise, American could
not enforce the agreement itself. It had to rely on the DEP to hold the Department of Defense
to its contractual obligations.
5. "It shall be a condition to the obligations of both Buyer and Seller hereunder
that the Third Party Properties3 0 be conveyed by separate direct deed of
seller to a grantee or grantees simultaneously with the transfer of the balance
of the property to Buyer. Seller shall not be obligated to convey any of the
property to Buyer, unless seller is able to convey all of the property, and
conversely, Buyer shall not be obligated to accept title to the Third Party
Properties;
6. Buyer shall undertake to identify a grantee or grantees willing to accept title to the
Third Party Properties, which may be, at Buyer's option, any combination of (i)
Buyer, (ii) the Town, (iii) an organized conservation trust or entity which regularly
takes title to parcels of land for long-term conservation purposes, or (iv) other
30 The "Third Party Properties" include the tank farm, generator building, fire station, and all other
improvements located on the "tank farm parcel."
responsible entity reasonably acceptable to Seller, willing to accept such title;
7. In addition, if Buyer is unable to identify grantees of all of the Third Party
Properties as provided above, Buyer shall be entitled to elect to terminate this
Agreement by giving notice thereof to Seller, and to receive a refund of the
Deposit even if such notice is given after the date which is 90 days after the
execution of this Agreement;
8. The agreed purchase price for the property is Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($350,000), of which (i) $25,000 has been paid as a deposit
upon the execution of this Agreement, (ii) $325,000 will be paid at the time of the
delivery and recording of the Deed."
First Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement
The First Amendment to the Purchase and Sale agreement made the following
important changes:
1. "Delete number (4) from above and replace it with..."The Tank Farm Closure
Plan submitted in 1988, approved in 1990, shall have been completed, as
evidenced by the issuance of a letter from the state DEP, confirming that the Tank
Farm Closure Plan has been completed, except for certain monitoring and testing
which are required to be continuing in nature, and which may continue past the
Closing Date;
2. Seller shall not be obligated to expend more than an aggregate of $10,000 of
Seller's funds to remove or remediate the materials described [above (e.g.,
asbestos, petroleum hydrocarbons, etc.)] If the cost to Seller.. .is more than an
aggregate of $10,000, and if Seller does not elect to expend sums in excess of
$10,000 in order to complete the removal or remediation, then Buyer shall have
the right, but not the obligation, to expend sums in excess of those spent by Seller
to complete the removal or remediation. If Buyer does not so elect to spend
additional sums... then Buyer shall have the option to terminate this Agreement,
whereupon the Deposit shall be retained by Seller, and this Agreement shall
become null and void and without further recourse to the parties."
This clause was very important in that it placed a cap on the Seller's remediation
exposure. In addition, the Buyer agreed to assume the cost of remediation for some very
specific contaminants in some very specific areas. If the total costs exceeded $10,000, the
Buyer could either expend the necessary sums or terminate the deal. Upon termination, the
Seller would retain American's deposit.
Second Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement
Since American was unable to obtain a grantee willing to accept title to the
contaminated parcel, it created one that would: American of Virginia, Inc. As of this
amendment, the Buyer signed all documents as: "Open Space Buyer - American of Virginia,
Inc; Lot Buyer - Birch Island Residential Limited Partnership, by American of Birch Island,
Inc., its General Partner." American still anticipated transferring the open space to the Town
of Birch Island upon the completion of all remediation work required under the closure order.
The Town would also enjoy all of the liability protections that were associated with the
VRAP.
The Second Amendment to the Purchase and Sale agreement made the following
important changes:
1. "The agreed purchase price for the property is Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($350,000), of which (i) $25,000 has been paid as a deposit upon the
execution of this Agreement, (ii) $100,000 will be paid at the time of the delivery
and recording of the Deed, (iii) $160,000 will be paid at the time of the delivery
and recording of the Deed by Birch Island Residential Limited Partnership, the
"Lot Buyer", executing a Promissory Note in the principal amount of
$160,000, secured by a Mortgage, (iv) $65,000 will be credited to Buyer at the
time of the delivery and recording of the Deed as a contribution toward costs
Open Space Buyer shall incur in connection with closure activities;"
With the above addition, the Seller sweetened the deal by crediting the Open Space
Buyer (American of Virginia, Inc.) with $65,000, and by providing a $160,000 non-recourse
purchase money mortgage to the lot buyer (BIRLP). Although American had obtained a
commitment from a local lender for non-recourse project financing, it opted to accept the
seller financing. O'Connor stated that the local lender would have been comfortable lending
the money based on the protections set forth in the state voluntary program.
2. "At the closing, the Property will be partitioned into two separate portions,
and the Purchase Price shall be allocated to those two separate portions as follows:
(i) the portion of the Purchase Price allocated to the Open Space Land is $150,000,
including the $65,000 credit, and the entity that will take title to this portion of the
property from the Seller will be American of Virginia, Inc. (the "Open Space
Buyer"), (ii) the portion of the Purchase Price allocated to the Parcel Land is
$200,000, and the entity that will take title to this portion of the property will be
Birch Island Residential Limited Partnership (the "Lot Buyer");
3. Number (1) from the First Amendment has not been completely fulfilled
since certain of the requirements of the DEP for the Closure Plan have not
been completed at the date of the closing by the Seller and by the Federal
Government.. .Commencing at the Closing Date, Open Space Buyer shall be
responsible to perform all of the requirements in the DEP Closure Order, to
the extent not performed as of the Closing Date by the Seller;"
The $65,000 credit described above is to cover any costs associated with the
remaining requirements under the DEP Closure Order. American had taken on the financial
responsibility of completing the remediation plan that was approved by the DEP under the
VRAP. At this point, the seller had already spent close to one million dollars ($1,000,000)
and had completed the brunt of the work required. Although the Seller was "on the hook"
under CERCLA legislation, it was able to shift the burden of remediation oversight to
American.
4. "As required by the DEP Closure Order Conditions for Approval, Open Space
Buyer shall be responsible for completing in accordance with the DEP's approved
work plan those closure activities which will be accomplished by the Army Corp
of Engineers through its Defense and Environmental Restoration Program. In this
regard, Seller shall provide Buyer, and to the extent possible assign to Buyer at
Closing, the written contracts and agreements between seller and the Army Corp
of Engineers (Department of Defense), outlining the specific responsibilities of the
Army Corp of Engineers;
5. As required by the DEP Closure Order Conditions for Approval, to the extent not
performed as of the Closing Date, Open Space Buyer shall continue the balance of
the two (2) year quarterly ground water monitoring program;
6. As required by the DEP Closure Order Conditions for Approval, in the event that
the monitoring and closure activities have not been completed at the time of
transfer of any part of the Property acquired by the Open Space Buyer, Open
Space Buyer shall state in the sale agreement the responsibilities of each party
relating to the closure and monitoring activities to be completed at the site by
Open Space Buyer to ensure the conditions of the DEP Closure Order are met;
7. In consideration of the $65,000 credit to be given to Buyer by Seller, Buyer,
Lot Buyer, and Open Space Buyer (together the "Purchasing Parties"), and
their respective successors and assigns shall (as of the time of Closing)
acknowledge their satisfaction with, waive and release Seller from, and
assume any of the Seller's remaining obligations of number (4) from the
original agreement and the obligations under the DEP Closure Order which
have been assumed by Open Space Buyer. The Purchasing Parties
acknowledge that upon the Closing hereunder they shall accept their
respective interest in the Property with full knowledge of the contamination
identified in the DEP Closure Order, including all plans, reports and test
analysis results referenced in that order;"
With this clause, the Seller contributed $65,000 to the Buyer for assuming its risk. If
the cost of remediation that was required under the DEP was greater than $65,000, American
was responsible for the overage. In addition, although this clause tended to decrease the
marketability of the lots, American believed they understood the market well enough to
assume the marketing risks of the project. As previously mentioned, a large percentage of
their buyers would be Island residents who understood the history and level of contamination
that previously existed on the site.
8. "The Purchasing Parties shall (as of the time of Closing) waive, release and
forever discharge Seller, its officers, shareholders, directors, employees and
agents and their respective successors and assigns (collectively the "Selling
Parties") from all actions, causes of action, suits, controversies, damages,
judgements, claims and demands whatsoever, in law, admiralty or equity, which
against the Selling Parties they and their successors and assigns ever had, now
have or hereinafter can, shall or may have for, upon or by reason of any matter,
cause or thing, but only to the extent relating to the presence of fuel oil, gasoline or
any other petroleum products at the Property and only to the extent described in
the DEP Closure Order, including all plans, reports and test analysis results
referenced in the DEP Closure Order. The provisions of this paragraph shall
survive the delivery of the Deed;"
Note that the above clause did not release the Seller from liability to the government.
This statement only applied to the relationship between the Seller and the Buyer. However,
this did provide the Seller with reassurances that American could not bring action against
them in the future.
9. "The Promissory Note in the principal amount of $160,000, secured by a
Mortgage, shall be executed by the Lot Buyer, shall be due and payable two years
after the execution thereof, and shall bear fixed interest at a rate at 2% over the
Prime Rate at the time of closing, with annual principal payments on the
anniversary date of the closing, in the amount of $80,000 on the first anniversary
and $80,000 on the second anniversary."
Third Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement
The Third Amendment to the Purchase and Sale agreement made the following
important changes:
1. "The agreed purchase price for the property is Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($350,000), of which (i) $25,000 has been paid as a deposit upon the
execution of this Agreement, (ii) $75,000 will be paid at the time of the delivery
and recording of the Deed, (iii) $120,000 will be paid at the time of the delivery
and recording of the Deed by Birch Island Residential Limited Partnership,
the "Lot Buyer", executing a Promissory Note in the principal amount of
$120,000, secured by a Mortgage, (iv) $65,000 will be credited to Buyer at the
time of the delivery and recording of the Deed as a contribution toward costs Open
Space Buyer shall incur in connection with closure activities, (v) $65,000 will be
credited to Buyer at the time of the delivery and recording of the Deed as a
contribution toward costs Open Space Buyer shall incur in connection with
defending the Evans appeal of the DEP Closure Order and potential
additional closure activities;"
Based on this additional clause, the Seller credited the Open Space Buyer with an
additional sixty-five thousand dollars ($65,000) to defend the Evans Appeal. Due to the
additional credit, the "cash payment" due to Seller at Closing decreased by twenty-five
thousand dollars ($25,000) and the amount of seller financing dropped by forty thousand
dollars ($40,000). The Evans Appeal was based on an appeal filed by Mr. Evans, an abutter to
the property. Not satisfied with the underground oil tanks being cleaned and sealed, Mr.
Evans insisted that the DEP should require their removal. However, due to the high cost of
collapsing and removing the fifteen oil tanks, the proposal by Mr. Evans was not feasible.
To date, Mr. Evans' appeal has gone as far as the State Supreme Court and has been
unsuccessful in every attempt. Since Mr. Evans can take his case to one more court, the U.S.
Supreme Court, American used this as an opportunity to effectively lower their purchase
price. The $65,000 will be used to defend an appeal if and when it occurs. American has
assumed all of the Seller's risk related to this appeal. If the cost of litigation was greater than
$65,000, American would bear the overage. However, it the expenses associated with this
appeal became exceedingly high, American had the ability to terminate the transaction and
forfeit its deposit.
Drivers of the Deal
The major catalyst of this deal was the recently enacted Voluntary Response Action
Plan (VRAP). As mentioned above, a prospective purchaser can expressly be relieved of
government liability before or after a purchase once the property has been remediated to the
DEP's satisfaction. In a series of letters from the state DEP to the developer's counsel, the
DEP stated:
"The Department of Environmental Protection (hereinafter the
"Department") has reviewed the request of your client for a no action
assurance for the subject property. The Department's prior (and continuing)
involvement in this site has resulted in a variance request that was filed with
the Board of Environmental Protection (BEP).
Provided that the Seller, and their successors and/or assigns,
specifically including your client, follow the conditions of the Variance
Request and successfully and satisfactorily complete the remedial
activities required by said document, the Department will not
undertake enforcement actions with respect to the site against the
Seller, your client and their successors and/or assigns for conducting
these activities.
This no action assurance is restricted to the terms outlined in the
Variance Request and may expire without further notice if new information
becomes available indicating that activities at the Tank Facility have caused
contamination at the site, including but not limited to ground water in the
surrounding area.
Upon satisfactory completion of those activities, the Department
shall issue a certificate of completion and the Parties and their
successors and/or assigns shall receive the protection from liability
afforded by the State's VRAP.
As also indicated in the earlier letter, the Federal Government is also
undertaking cleanup action at the Site pursuant to the agreement by the
Department of Defense to assume responsibility for and undertake
remediation of certain portions of the site (the "Federal Areas.") To the
extent new information becomes available indicating that the activities
undertaken by the Federal Government have caused contamination at the
Site, including but not limited to ground water contamination in the
surrounding area, or that further remedial action is required with respect to
the Federal Areas, the Department reserves all its rights to seek enforcement
and/or other appropriate action against the Federal Government or other
appropriate federal entity(ies). The Department will not take action
against the Parties and any of their successors and/or assigns in
connection with the Federal Areas."
Although this letter from the Department of Environmental Protection provided
American with limited environmental liability at the state level, it did not provide protection
from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In this regard, however, Birch Island is
unique. If the EPA decided to push the developer for higher standards of remediation, they
would be pursuing another federal agency, the Department of Defense. Had the Department
of Defense not been involved in the site's original contamination, an investor/developer would
most likely want some assurances from the federal as well as state environmental agencies.
In addition, the second paragraph of the DEP letter provided protection for the Seller
under the VRAP. Since the Seller was not a potentially responsible party, it was afforded
protections against specific standards of contamination. However, as mentioned earlier, the
Seller has been held accountable by the DEP for additional discoveries that were not covered
under the voluntary remediation plan.
Financial Drivers
From a risk versus reward perspective, this project was a success. Before the closing,
all that American had at risk was the initial deposit of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).
This gave O'Connor the ability to walk away from the deal if the cost of remediation was
greater than expected. Once the parties had reached the closing, the financial risk increased.
Since American had to deposit an additional seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) at the
closing on August 31, 1995, their total investment at risk was now one hundred thousand
dollars ($100,000). In addition, American obtained a loan in the amount of one hundred
twenty thousand dollars ($120,000) from the Seller through the lot buyer, BIRLP. Since the
seller financing was non-recourse, American could still walk away from the deal if they were
willing to forfeit their one hundred thousand dollar ($100,000) deposit.
Within six months of the closing, American had sold two of the parcels for an
aggregate amount of one hundred twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($112,500). Since
ninety-seven thousand five hundred dollars ($97,500) of the total was from the sale of a 1.84
acre parcel sold to the Town of Birch Island, one can assume that American was aware of this
pending transaction when they closed on the property.
Now that their initial investment had been returned through the two lot sales, the
remaining risk was to sell enough lots to pay back the purchase money mortgage and to cover
the project's legal and engineering costs. Keep in mind, this was a non-recourse loan, and
American had the ability once again to walk away from the deal if they could not successfully
market the remaining lots. The other risk at this time was the Evans Appeal. If the legal costs
associated with this appeal became exceedingly high, American had the option of defaulting
on the note, thus handing the property back to the Seller. American was marketing the various
residential parcels for a total of eight hundred twenty-six thousand dollars ($826,000.)
Assuming the market was receptive to the offering, American stood to earn a handsome return
on its investment.
American was not the only principal to do well in this transaction. The Seller
also achieved levels of protection under the state voluntary remediation program and
received certain releases from liability with the Buyer. Although the Seller could not
eliminate the liability associated with additional discoveries or changes in future
legislation, they were protected under state law for the specific remediation actions
defined by the approved remediation plan. In addition, they received $100,000 in
cash and $120,000 in the form of seller financing which would be fully amortized
after two years. Overall, this deal was a "win-win" situation for both the Buyer and
Seller.
Lessons Learned
The most important reason to conduct thesis research through the case study method is
to be able to garner the knowledge that was obtained by the participants in "real deals."
Furthermore, there are always a few pitfalls that can be avoided in the future thanks to the
efforts of the daring brownfields pioneers like American Residential Development. Below are
some of the major "lessons learned" through the Birch Island project.
American and its team of lawyers and engineers did not accept the level of testing that
had been performed by the previous owner and the DEP. The company insisted on
conducting its own series of tests and, as a result, raised the required standard of remediation
for the site. Since O'Connor believed that American stood to lose the most if the project
failed, he insisted on pushing the envelope of the proposed remediation. Essential to this
effort was a highly competent team of legal and environmental professionals. An expert team
that is more competent than the state and seller is critical to the success of a project.
According to American's lawyer, some additional coordination was needed to obtain
assurances that the property had been adequately remediated and that no further action would
be required. This additional legwork was a result of the closure being handled by a different
part of the DEP than the group responsible for the Voluntary Response Action Program. The
lesson to be learned here is that lots of government agencies are involved in the process of
brownfields redevelopment. As such, they can not be relied upon to communicate with each
other and within their own offices. Strong legal counsel will recognize this and react
accordingly. Going forward, one must wonder if the EPA/DEP can make this process more
efficient? This could eliminate many uncertainties and a great deal of risk that in turn could
spur increased interest in the redevelopment of brownfields.
When available, real estate investors should obtain non-recourse financing. With this
in mind, investors in brownfields have a unique opportunity. Sellers of contaminated
properties do not have a large market of buyers available to them. They might have to
sweeten the deal to attract serious buyers, and providing non-recourse, seller financing is one
such way. From the buyer's perspective, their risk is lowered if they have the option of
walking away from the deal. Also, the purchase money mortgage lowers their initial
investment. This impacts both their return on investment, and also their total capital at risk in
the project.
Despite all of the laws, regulations, and newly enacted brownfields initiatives, a few
individuals can cause a project to become financially unfeasible. Unfortunately, brownfield
projects tend to affect people on an emotional level. All other things being equal, neighbors
will always want to see every ounce of contamination removed, regardless of cost or
feasibility. Given easy access to the judicial system, individuals, like Mr. Evans, can appeal to
the courts thus introducing additional cost and uncertainty into the redevelopment process.
Unfortunately, there is little that can be done to prevent such lawsuits other than working
closely with the community to educate neighbors and abutters about the remediation process.
Absent good information, neighbors will usually assume the worse. The smart developer will
both work proactively to gain the confidence of the community as well as structure his or her
transaction to minimize the consequences of lawsuits that may, in the end, be unavoidable.
CHAPTER 4
Main Street Office Park
History31
While completing the due diligence phase for the acquisition of a portfolio of
properties, a prominent real estate investment trust (REIT) discovered environmental
contamination affecting the only undeveloped parcel in the portfolio (the "Main Street Site.")
Located in a strong, suburban office market, the portfolio consisted of prime office properties
and the undeveloped parcel. Elevated levels of a contaminant called trichloroethene 32 (TCE)
were found in the groundwater near the border of an adjacent automobile garage (the "Source
Site.")
Subsequent environmental testing showed relatively high concentrations of TCE on
the Main Street Site and an extremely high level on the Source Site. While it could not be
conclusively ascertained, it is most probable that the Source Site was (and is) the source of the
TCE contamination on the Main Street Site. Since the direction of the groundwater flow at
the Source Site was mostly away from the Main Street Site, it was assumed that the migration
of the TCE via groundwater most likely had occurred over a number of years (15+). It was
impractical, therefore, to simply remediate the Main Street Site without having the Source Site
also undergo remediation work.
Further complicating matters was the fact that the Source Site was owned and
controlled by a family trust (the "Source Owners.") While the Source Owners were
cooperative, they would most likely not have the financial resources necessary to undertake
31 Information on history of site provided in Environmental Briefing authored by REIT's senior acquisitions
analyst.
32 TCE is a solvent used in de-greasing processes and is a known carcinogen.
the scope of the required remediation work. In addition, the regulatory agencies and rules that
governed this type of remediation work (primarily the State Department of Environmental
Quality, or "DEQ") were bureaucratic and complex.
Three sets of principals (e.g., Seller, Buyer, and Source Owner), their legal counsel
and their environmental consultants worked together to understand the laws and the
implications associated with the environmental issues at these properties. A thorough
understanding of the issues, laws, and future course of remediation, along with a negotiated
agreement between the Buyer and the Seller, were the components that allowed the REIT to
close on the purchase of the portfolio in a relatively short period of time (approximately one
year). Among other provisions, the negotiated agreements called for the seller to escrow part
of the sales proceeds to be applied toward future remediation costs. As will be discussed later,
this was very important to the transaction because the buyer had "deeper pockets" than the
seller.
The REIT acquired the portfolio for an undisclosed amount of consideration
consisting of assumption of mortgage debt and the issuance of Operating Partnership Units
("OP Units.") According to the REIT's Annual Report, "each OP Unit may be redeemed for
either one share of common stock or, at the option of the Company, cash equal to the fair
market value of a share of common stock at the time of the redemption." REIT transactions
are frequently structured in this manner so that the seller of appreciated property does not have
to recognize taxable gain at the time of receipt of the OP Units. Gain is recognized only at the
time the OP Units are converted to cash or stock.
OP Unit Pricing
Although "time is of the essence" in most all real estate transactions, this is especially
true if the transaction involves a "capital play." In this particular transaction, the Seller was
swapping property (e.g. office buildings and undeveloped land) to a publicly traded real estate
investment trust in exchange for operating partnership units that are the functional equivalent
of stock in the REIT. During this period, the REIT's price per share of common stock was
increasing rapidly and outperforming all of the major market indices.
One of the major risks to the Seller was that they would receive fewer Units at closing
due to the rising market. The acquisition price was fixed in dollars from the beginning and the
only variable was the "average of the closing prices of the common stock of the Buyer for
each trading day that occurred during the thirty consecutive calendar days commencing the
date of this Agreement." The higher the "average price" was, the fewer OP Units for the
Seller at closing. With all of this in mind, the Seller should have known it was in its best
interest to consummate this transaction as quickly as possible. Although not directly a
brownfields issue, the motivation of the Seller to complete the deal in a short timeframe may
have resulted in the buyer having a stronger negotiating position regarding the brownfields
issues. However, this is purely speculative for two reasons. First, none of the other case
studies utilized for this research involved a REIT. Second, the acquisitions team from the
REIT stated that the Seller never mentioned the rapidly increasing OP Unit value.
Option Agreement
As stated in Chapter 2, an option enables an investor to control a piece of property for
a period of time without committing to ownership. During this period, the holder of the option
can secure financing, obtain tenants or begin the entitlement process. The holder can also
walk away from the deal at the end of the option period, thus forfeiting the option price. This
strategy allows a developer to eliminate some of the development risk (e.g., financing,
marketing, and permitting) before committing great amounts of resources to the project. In
addition to capping the development risk, an option also serves to protect the investor in the
early stages of a project. By avoiding the "chain of title," the investor can avoid any and all
liability associated with the site until the project risks are quantified.
However, the above reasons were not the motivating factors behind the REIT's choice
of using an option agreement for this acquisition. Its sole intent was to carve out a period of
due diligence, during which it could fully understand the contamination issues. Whereas most
option agreements grant the holder a long period of time to conduct due diligence and begin
the entitlement process, this agreement only allowed for a thirty to sixty-day period.
However, every amendment to the original agreement extended the investigation period even
further. These extensions represented an opportunity cost to the Seller; nonetheless, they were
needed to allow the REIT to get comfortable with the environmental issues. According to the
Buyer, "even though this agreement was in the form of an option, it was no better or worse
than a purchase and sale agreement."
Some of the relevant components of the initial agreement were as follows:
1. "Grant and Exercise of Option: The Option may be exercised by Buyer's giving
written notice of Buyer's exercise to Seller within the period commencing on the
thirtieth (30t") day from the date of this Agreement and ending on the sixtieth
(6 0 th) day from the date of this Agreement;
2. Deposit: Simultaneously with the execution and delivery of this Agreement, Buyer
shall deliver... $500,000 to be held in escrow;
3. Grant and Exercise of Option: The notice of exercise of the Option by Buyer shall
be accompanied by, and the effective exercise of the Option shall be conditioned
upon, delivery.. .of $1,500,000 to be held in escrow. The notice of exercise of
Option shall also set the Closing Date, not less than thirty (30) days nor more than
sixty (60) days after the date such notice is given;
The REIT paid $500,000 in cash to the Seller to obtain the initial option agreement.
This deposit was fully refundable upon termination of the agreement. It was not at risk until
the Buyer exercised the option, at which time an additional $1,500,000 would be placed in an
escrow account.
4. Termination: Buyer shall have the right, in its sole discretion, to terminate this
Agreement at any time on or before the Option Exercise Date. Upon any such
termination, the Deposit shall immediately be refunded to Buyer, and.. .the rights
and obligations of each of the parties to this Agreement shall cease and terminate
and none of such parties shall have further liability under this Agreement;"
With this clause, the Buyer had the ability to walk away from the deal before the
Option Exercise Date. The total amount of the Buyer's refundable deposit was $500,000. In
addition, this clause gave the Buyer the ability to get a better understanding of the level of
contamination on the site before it put any large sums of capital at risk (e.g. $2 million).
5. "Tests and Inspections: Seller hereby authorizes Buyer.. .to enter upon the
Premises from time to time and to perform such tests and inspections as
Buyer deems necessary or appropriate in its sole discretion, including, without
limitation, such soil boring and compacting tests, test well and water table, soil
porosity and liquid absorption tests, other environmental inspections and tests, and
engineering tests. All expenses for such tests, inspections and restoration shall be
the responsibility of the Buyer;
6. Environmental, Health and Safety Matters - Representations and Warranties:
Each Seller hereby represents and warrants as follows, but only with respect
to its portion of the Premises:
i. To the best of Seller's knowledge.. .there have been no releases,
including, without limitation, migrations of hazardous materials or any
other substances or materials regulated under any Environmental Law
(collectively, "Hazardous Materials") at, on, under, onto, about or
emanating from Seller's portion of the Premises during its period of
ownership, and to the best of Seller's knowledge, there has been no such
release at any other time;
ii. Seller has been issued, and Seller is in material compliance with, all
orders, directives, requirements, certificates and Permits from applicable
governmental authorities relating to Environmental Laws applicable to
Seller's portion of the Premises;
iii. Neither Seller's portion of the Premises nor any portion thereof is listed
or, to the best of Seller's knowledge, proposed for listing on the National
Priorities List pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, as amended ("CERCLA") or on any
state list of sites requiring remedial action;"
The above statement, "[tjo the best of Seller's knowledge...," had serious legal
ramifications. The Seller was only giving representations and warranties regarding
contamination that were known to them. Therefore, any contaminants that were discovered
through testing by the Buyer were not covered under this statement if the Seller was unaware
of them. However, under the Agreement, the Buyer was required to share all "knowledge"
and discoveries with the Seller. This was a very important fact. If the Buyer told the Seller
about a recently found plume of contamination, the Seller was now considered to be "aware"
of the contamination. This contamination would then be "covered" under the representations
and warranties clause of any future amendments. With this in mind, the Buyer had to conduct
its own series of tests. It could not rely upon the Seller's knowledge.
Another concern to the Buyer was the statement: "[e]ach Seller hereby represents and
warrants as follows, but only with respect to its portion of the Premises." A major risk
inherent in this transaction was that the "Seller" actually consisted of many limited
partnerships. Each one was giving "representations and warranties" on its portion of the
Premises only. What if some sellers were better capitalized than others were? What happened
if one seller got into financial distress? Would they dissolve their limited partnerships after the
sale? The Buyer handled this issue in the forthcoming Fifth Amendment to the Option
Agreement by requiring the Seller to set aside proceeds from the sale into an escrow account
for remediation expenses.
7. "Miscellaneous: All representations and warranties of Seller shall survive the
Closing Date for a period of twelve (12) months, other than those contained in
[numbers (6.i. - iii.) above.] Seller shall have no liability for any
misrepresentation with respect to which a claim is made by Buyer after such
twelve (12) month period;"
Since the REIT would place itself in the title chain before the twelve-month period
expired, it would be exposed to the unlimited liability of an owner anyway. However, the
REIT intended to limit this liability in the future by remediating or causing the Seller to
remediate the site under the state voluntary remediation program. Also, since the REIT had
"deeper pockets" than the Seller did, it would be responsible for the majority of future liability
(e.g., future discoveries, stricter legislation, etc.)
Third Amendment to Option Agreement
The Third Amendment to the Option Agreement made the following important
changes:
1. "Termination: [The following was added to the original clause:] Buyer shall have
the right, in its sole discretion, to terminate this Agreement by written notice
to Seller at any time on or before the date which is thirty (30) days following
the date of the Third Amendment (the "Remediation Plan Approval Date") if
Buyer is not satisfied, in its sole discretion, with the environmental condition
of the Premises, the Remediation Plan, any proposed arrangement for the escrow
and disbursement of funds or other security therefore, as requested by Buyer in its
sole discretion, the implementation of any such proposed remediation plan or any
matters relating to any of the foregoing;"
This clause was used to grant to the Buyer an extension of its due diligence period.
Up to this point, the Buyer had deposited $500,000 with the original Agreement, which was
fully refundable. However, many hours of time, as well as legal and environmental expenses,
had been invested. Although the Buyer would receive back its initial deposit upon
termination, the time spent thus far was considered a "sunk cost." With this in mind, the
Buyer had to reevaluate the deal with regard to risk and return at every stage. This clause gave
it the ability to extend their period of investigation before it needed to place $2,000,000 at risk.
2. "As-Is Acquisition: Buyer agrees to accept the Premises "AS IS", "WHERE
IS" and "WITH ALL FAULTS" in its condition as of the Option Exercise
Date, subject to Seller's obligations under the Remediation Plan, ordinary
wear and tear during the Interim Period, and the representations and warranties
made in this Agreement."
Although the Buyer agreed to purchase the Premises on an "AS IS" basis, the Seller
would still be held accountable for its obligations under a remediation plan (the "Remediation
Plan") that needed approval from the state DEQ and the REIT. Since there was no monetary
cap on the Seller's obligation to remediate the site, it assumed all of the financial risks of the
remediation. The Buyer's risk was that the Seller would not perform the remediation, or they
would perform it incorrectly. If there were problems in the future, which party would be held
accountable to cure it? All of these issues would be hashed out in the Fifth Amendment to the
Option Agreement.
Fifth Amendment to the Option Agreement
Beginning with the First Amendment to the Option Agreement, the documents
referred to "Buyer" and "Main Street Site Owner." Buyer referred to the REIT that would
purchase the portfolio of office buildings, and Main Street Site Owner referred to the entity
that would purchase the contaminated, undeveloped parcel of land (the Main Street Site). This
distinction allowed the REIT to purchase the contaminated site through a different entity if it
so desired.
In the end, the REIT chose to acquire the entire portfolio through its existing entity.
Although another entity could have been established to acquire the contaminated parcel, the
Buyer knew it would be recognized as a shell, and, as such, would not limit their liability.
Furthermore, it felt comfortable with the escrow balance that was established at Closing.
Since the REIT chose not to purchase the Main Street Site through a different entity, the terms
"Buyer" and "Main Street Site Owner" will be modified to "Buyer" throughout the rest of this
chapter.
The Fifth Amendment to the Option Agreement outlined the arrangements that were
negotiated to handle the environmental issues affecting the Main Street Site. These
contractual arrangements included:
1. "Establishment of Escrow: Upon closing...OP Units [valued at $1
million].. .will be delivered to the Title Insurer to be held in escrow pursuant
to the terms of an escrow agreement;"
As mentioned earlier, the Buyer was concerned that the Seller was actually a
collection of numerous limited partnerships. Fearing that the limited partnerships would
dissolve after the Closing, an escrow account was established to cover remediation expenses.
The Seller was not the only participant with a capital market risk inherent in this transaction.
The Buyer's risk was that the escrow balance, which was based on OP Unit value, would
decline if the share price of the REIT declined. If the value of the OP Units were rising, the
Seller could swap the Units out for cash and capitalize on the arbitrage opportunity. However,
if the value of the Units were decreasing, the Seller would have to fund the deficit. The Buyer
was assuming the credit risk of the Seller. If the escrow balance decreased in value, would the
Seller be willing and able to rectify the shortage?
Just as important as the creation of the escrow funds was the establishment of a "cap"
on the Seller's financial liability. The first clause of the Fifth Agreement essentially "capped"
the Seller's liability for the site remediation at $1 million. Any remediation expense that fell
under the requirements of the Remediation Plan and was over and above the $1 million level
would be borne by the REIT.
The "uncapped" liability of site remediation that now fell under the responsibility of
the Buyer could have presented a major concern to the shareholders of the REIT. However,
the Buyer was only responsible for the remediation levels that were required under the DEQ
approved Remediation Plan. Furthermore, if the Buyer deemed the Remediation Plan to be
too costly, it could terminate the deal on that basis. According to the REIT's Annual Report:
"In connection with the acquisition of the [Main Street Site], the
sellers have reported the findings of contamination to the [State] Department
of Environmental Quality and have retained an environmental consultant to
prepare a remediation plan. Units valued at approximately $1.0 million
were escrowed from the purchase price to be released to the seller upon
performance of remediation pursuant to a remediation plan approved by the
Company. The escrow further provides that the Company may receive
some or all of the remaining escrowed Units upon certain conditions. The
Company does not believe that any costs, if incurred, in connection with
these environmental matters would have a material adverse effect on the
financial position, results of operations, or liquidity of the Company."33
Based on the following clause, the Seller had to seek agreements from the owners of
the Source Site that would give the Seller access to the Source Site for remediation or that
obligated the Source Site owners to perform the remediation themselves.
2. "Arrangements with Adjacent Property Owner: Seller agrees to seek promptly and
to pursue diligently, continuously and in good faith the entry into agreement(s)
(collectively, once approved by [Buyer] as provided below in this Section, the
"Source Site Remediation Agreements") with the owner of the site adjacent to the
Main Street Site. The Source Site Remediation Agreements shall provide
Seller with access to the Source Site to perform or cause to be performed
remediation of contamination thereon or contain the agreement of the owner
of the Source Site and its successors and assigns to perform remediation of
contamination on the Source Site, in each case pursuant to the Remediation Plan
(as defined below). The Source Site Remediation Agreements shall be in form
and substance reasonably satisfactory to Seller, the owner of the Source Site and
Buyer, including, without limitation, by containing provisions which cause such
Agreements to be binding on successor of the Source Site, and the interest of
Seller therein shall be fully assignable to [Buyer] (and its successors and
3 The identity of the REIT will remain unnamed.
assigns) without the consent of the owner of the Source Site. Except as otherwise
set forth in this Agreement, Seller shall have no liability for failure to obtain the
Source Site Remediation Agreements;"
A major risk to the Seller and the Buyer was that the Source Site testing that would be
performed could have exacerbated the contamination. In order to avoid this risk, both the
Buyer and the Seller used insured, third party environmental engineering firms. Thus, the risk
of aggravating the contamination could be managed by hiring competent engineering firms.
However, an even greater risk of the above clause was that the Seller might not get the
necessary approvals from the Source Site Owner. If this happened, the Buyer could terminate
the deal before the Option was exercised. If the Buyer chose to exercise the Option prior to
the Seller obtaining the Source Site Remediation Agreements, it would place itself in a riskier
position.
In fact, the Buyer did acquire the portfolio before the Remediation Agreements were
obtained. They felt comfortable about this assumption of risk for two reasons. First, the
escrowed funds of $1 million would likely cover the remediation costs of both the Source Site
and the Main Street Site. Second, if the Seller could not obtain the Source Site Remediation
Agreements by the fifth anniversary of this Amendment or if the Seller had dissolved, the
Buyer would receive the remaining escrow balance. Furthermore, the Buyer did not have to
remediate the site under the voluntary program; it could remediate the site under the current
state and federal regulations. However, as described in the next section, the voluntary
program offers the advantage of providing finite closure certification upon completion of the
remediation.
From the Seller's perspective, if it never obtained the proper approvals, it would still
have the OP Units from the closing proceeds. The Seller's only loss would be the potential
balance left in the escrow account.
According to the Amendment, once the Seller had obtained the Source Site
Remediation Agreements, it had to obtain approvals for a remediation plan covering the
Source Site and the Main Street Site from the State DEQ.
3. "Obtaining of DEQ Approval by Seller: Promptly upon obtaining the Source
Site Remediation Agreements, Seller shall take or cause to be taken all
reasonable actions necessary to obtain, and shall diligently, continuously and
in good faith seek to obtain, the approval of the State Department of
Environmental Quality (the "DEQ) (such approval, "DEQ Approval") and
[Buyer] of a remediation plan for the Source Site and Main Street Site. Such
remediation plan, as approved by Seller, the owner of the Source Site, DEQ and
[Buyer] shall comply at all times with all applicable Laws, including, without
limitation, all requirements of governmental authorities and shall be hereinafter
referred to.. .as the "Remediation Plan." Nothing herein contained shall require
the [Buyer] to approve a Remediation Plan if such plan is not under the
Voluntary Remediation Program (the "VRP") and nothing herein contained
shall require Seller to enter the VRP; provided, however, that the Remediation
Plan proposed to the owner of the Source Site shall require the Remediation Plan
to be under the VRP;"
The Remediation Plan was subject to the reasonable approval of the Buyer and the
Buyer had no obligation to approve any plan that was not under the State Voluntary
Remediation Program (VRP). The VRP had the advantage of providing finite closure
certification upon completion of the remediation and helped to protect the registered owner(s)
from any interim litigation, citations, or claims. The following is a description of the VRP
from the state DEQ:
"When the cleanup is satisfactorily completed, DEQ will issue a
"certification of satisfactory completion of remediation." This certification
provides assurance that, barring new data that contradict the decision,
the remediated site will not later become the subject of a DEQ
enforcement action.
It is anticipated that the Voluntary Remediation Program will
facilitate the sale and reuse of industrial and commercial properties. By
reusing developed properties, not only are economic benefits expected both
for the seller and the buyer, but also the trend toward expansion of
commercial sites onto pristine lands should decrease as the potential
environmental liabilities of developing on existing commercial properties is
diminished.
By overseeing the process, DEQ is able to ensure that the cleanup
achieves a satisfactory level of human health and environmental protection.
The program is not intended to serve as an alternative to, or refuge
from applicable laws, regulatory requirements, or enforcement
actions."
The alternative to the VRP program was a negotiated remediation standard and plan
with the applicable regulatory agencies; an open-ended closure certificate would be issued
upon completion of the remediation plan work that would allow the regulatory agencies to
make additional citations and claims against the same site and work.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, participants in brownfields redevelopment projects must
remember that state voluntary programs do not protect all parties from all risks. For example,
the liability protections received through these programs typically do not cover past
owner/operators of the site. If a seller is looking to forever be released from liability from the
state government, the seller may have to "initiate" the remediation process before transfer of
the title occurs. Also, the program only includes relevant provisions of state law; there is no
liability protection granted for applicable federal laws. Furthermore, the release from liability
under these programs is limited to the satisfactory remediation of all known contamination at
the time the "Certificate of Completion" was issued. This point was covered in the VRP
description:
"The immunity granted by issuance of the Certificate shall be
limited to site conditions at the time of issuance as those conditions are
described in the information submitted by the Participant pursuant to
participation in the program and is conditioned upon completeness and
accuracy of that information. The immunity does not apply in the event that
contamination posing an unacceptable risk to public health or the
environment is discovered after issuance of the Certificate."
Once a remediation plan was finalized, the Seller had to either remediate or cause the
Source Site owner to remediate, whichever was required under the Source Site remediation
agreements that the Seller was able to obtain. As stated in the following clause, the Seller was
not required to spend more than the escrow balance of $1,000,000 in remediating the Main
Street Site and in remediating or causing the remediation of the Source Site.
4. "Performance of Remediation: Promptly upon finalization of the Remediation
Plan, Seller shall commence or cause to be commenced and shall diligently,
continuously (subject to delays caused by events beyond the reasonable control of
Seller) and in good faith perform or cause to be performed to completion
remediation of the Source Site and Main Street Site in accordance with the
Remediation Plan and the Source Site Remediation Agreements. Seller shall
require all parties performing remediation on the Main Street Site to maintain
insurance providing coverage of the types and amounts and naming the [Buyer].
Seller shall diligently, continuously and in good faith seek from DEQ upon
completion of remediation in accordance with the Remediation Plan a
Certificate of Satisfactory Completion Remediation from the DEQ. Seller
shall not be obligated to expend more than [the escrow balance of $1,000,000];"
5. "Assignment of Source Site Remediation Agreements to [Buyerl: Upon the
default by Seller in the performance of any of its obligations under the
Agreement.. .or in the event the Seller fails to obtain the DEQ Approval by the
fifth (5t) anniversary of the date of this Amendment ...then... Seller shall assign
to [Buyer] its rights under the Source Site Remediation Agreements;"
The Buyer had to be ready and able to assume full responsibility for the remediation
process at any time. If the above clause went into effect, all remediation problems would fall
under the responsibility of the REIT. However, the REIT would assume this risk when it
placed itself in the "chain of title." Since the Buyer had "deeper pockets" than the Seller did,
it was completely exposed to any risk that was associated with the project once it enter the title
chain.
6. Delivery of Assets in Escrow to [Buyerl on the Occurrence of Certain Events: If
(i) the [Buyer] is ever required by Law.. .to perform any remediation on the Main
Street Site or Source Site other than as provided for in the Remediation Plan, (ii) a
lease is entered into for space in a building to be constructed on the Main Street
Site, or (iii) in the reasonable judgement of the [Buyer], a failure to act could result
in a claim against such owner on account of a change in the environmental
condition of Main Street Site or any matter resulting therefrom occurring
subsequent to the Closing Date, Seller shall cease to be entitled to [OP Units] and
Substitute Cash held in Escrow;"
The aforementioned clause added some flexibility to the Buyer. If the Buyer required,
the Seller had to perform remediation work beyond that which was specified in the approved
plan on the Source Site and/or Main Street Site as long as the Seller's financial burden did not
surpass the $1,000,000. The Buyer also had the right to perform the additional remediation
itself and receive reimbursement up to the remaining balance of the Escrow account if (1.) any
new law required remediation work; (2.) a lease was executed with a tenant for space in a
building to be constructed on the Main Street Site; or (3.) if Buyer felt remediation on the
Main Street Site was necessary to prevent the Buyer from environmental exposure liability to
a third party.
Since the REIT planned to develop the parcel when market rents justified new
construction, it would require construction financing. Although it could tap into unsecured
debt balances for this need, it preferred to use conventional construction financing. This
clause gave the REIT control over the remediation process. Without this level of control, most
lenders would have a difficult time underwriting the loan.
7. "Delivery of Assets in Escrow to [Buyerl Upon Failure to Obtain Certain
Approvals: If, on or before the fifth (5 th) anniversary of the date of this
Amendment, Seller has not.. .obtained the Source Site Remediation
Agreements and DEQ Approval, Seller shall cease to be entitled to any [OP
Units] and Substitute Cash held in Escrow, and [Buyer] shall be entitled to receipt
of [OP Units] and Substitute Cash being held in the Escrow equal in value in the
aggregate to the reasonable costs of remediation;
8. Delivery of Assets in Escrow to [Buyer] for Failure to Obtain Closure
Certification: Except as provided below in this Section, if Seller has not obtained
the Closure Certifications on or before the fifth (5 th) anniversary of the date
of the DEQ Approval.. .Seller shall cease to be entitled to any [OP Units] and
Substitute Cash held in Escrow, and [Buyer] shall be entitled to receipt of [OP
Units] and Substitute Cash being held in the Escrow equal in value in the
aggregate to the reasonable costs of remediation;
9. Delivery of Remaining Assets in Escrow to Seller on Receipt of Closure
Certifications: Upon receipt by [Buyer] of the Closure Certifications... Seller
shall become entitled to.. .any remaining OP Units.. .and Substitute Cash
then remaining in the Escrow;"
The above three clauses stipulated whether or not the Seller would receive any of the
remaining Escrow balance. The Seller would not be entitled to the balance remaining in the
escrow account if (1.) the Seller defaulted; (2.) the Seller failed to obtain the requisite
remediation agreements from the Source Site owners within five years from the date of the
Fifth Amendment; (3.) the Seller failed to obtain the necessary DEQ approval of a remediation
plan within five years from the date of the Fifth Amendment; or (4.) the Seller failed to obtain
the remediation closure certifications from the DEQ within five years of obtaining the DEQ's
approval of the remediation plan. In establishing these clauses, the REIT attempted to align
the Seller's interest with their own by establishing a monetary incentive for performance.
There are two risks for the Buyer with the above clauses. First, it must be ready and
able to take control of the process if the Seller fails. This necessitates that the Buyer and Seller
must continuously update each other as to the status of each requirement. Next, there is a risk
that neither party will be able to obtain the required approval from the state DEQ. Under this
scenario the REIT has entered the title chain, but has no way of limiting its liability through
the state voluntary program. It is essential that the Buyer understands the levels of
contamination before exercising its option.
10. "Retention of Rights against Owner of Source Site: The parties hereto agree that
Seller... and [Buyer] shall retain all of their rights in law and in equity against the
owner of the Source Site."
Very little focus has been placed on the Source Site Owner's responsibility to
remediate the Source Site. Due to their financial difficulties, all parties assumed that the
remediation work would have to be performed by the Seller and Buyer of the Main Street Site.
However, in the minute chance that the Source Site Owner could reimburse the parties that
remediated the site, this clause provided for the Seller to get fully reimbursed before the Buyer
did.
It is interesting to note that neither the Buyer nor the Seller was a "potentially
responsible party." However, assuming this transaction closed, the Buyer would join the
Seller in the title chain. Could these parties be held accountable for any future leeching from
the Source Site? If the Main Street Site contamination leeched onto abutting properties, which
party would be liable? According to the DEQ, under the VRP:
"The Participant reserves the right to seek contribution, indemnity,
or any other available remedy against any person other than the Department
found to be responsible or liable for contributions, indemnity, or otherwise
for any amounts which have been or will be expended by the Participant in
connection with the Site."
The REIT will not be held accountable for remediation activities at the Main
Street Site if they fall under the scope of the approved Remediation Plan. However,
if additional contaminants leech onto the Main Street Site from the Source Site or if
contaminants from the Main Street Site leech onto abutting parcels, then the REIT
will be held responsible for the remediation expenses. Even though they can pursue
the Source Site Owners for damages, the family trust will most likely not have the
resources necessary to cover such damages.
11. "Limitation on Seller's Liability: Except as provided in [number 6 above],
Buyer.. .hereby waive[s] any and all rights at law and in equity against Seller
on account of the existence of the contamination disclosed in the Seller's
Environmental Reports, including, without limitation, any claim for
diminution in value of Main Street Site on account thereof. Notwithstanding
the above, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to limit any of
Buyer's.. .rights at law or in equity for contribution or any similar right in the
event either of them incurs any liability to a third party on account of facts or
circumstances existing on or before the Closing Date with respect to the
environmental condition of the Main Street Site or the Source Site. For the
purpose of the immediately preceding sentence, "third party" shall not be deemed
to include any governmental agency;
12. Assignment: Buyer.. .shall have the right to assign all or any portion of their
interests in the Agreement to any subsequent owner or occupant of all or any
portion of the Main Street Site or any lender and, at Buyer's election, Seller
shall convey title to Main Street Site on the Closing Date to an entity elected
by Buyer."
Financial Drivers
Knowing nothing about the Seller's original investment in the portfolio, its true reward
from this deal had to be the tremendous return that the OP Units generated post closing. In
addition to receiving fair market value for an environmentally challenged site3 4, the Seller also
postponed having to pay capital gains tax. A taxable event will not occur until the Seller
redeems OP Units for stock, and then sells the stock. In addition, the Seller was relieved of
some environmental liabilities. Except for the funds in the escrow account, the Seller has
shifted all of its liability associated with the site to the REIT. Like the REIT, the Seller is not a
"potentially responsible party." They did not cause the contamination; the Source Site
Owners did. Finally, if the Seller remediates the site and receives the DEQ approval, they will
3 The sale price was equal to that of an uncontaminated site minus the escrow funds. However, under
certain conditions, the Seller could receive back a portion of the remaining escrow balance.
be entitled to additional escrow funds that were in excess of the remediation costs.
From the Buyer's perspective, it was acquiring a portfolio of well performing office
buildings and a parcel of land that, due to its location, had tremendous potential for future
development. The REIT was willing to enter this transaction due to the strength of the
properties and the local real estate market where the site is located. Also, as stated, the
potential upside of the undeveloped parcel, due to its location, was enormous.
The REIT assumed all of the marketing risk for the redevelopment of the site. It could
mitigate this risk by avoiding speculative construction. By participating in a build-to-suit
project or by pre-leasing the building, the REIT could lessen the risk that a tenant will not pay
"market rent" for the space. However, since the REIT will build an office building and
structured parking on the site someday, they can use either or both of the structures to "cap"
the remaining contamination.
In conclusion, the protection provided by the strong language of the State's Voluntary
Remediation Program helped the REIT quantify its liability and price the transaction
accordingly. The REIT is only responsible for the scope of remediation work required under
the "approved remediation plan." If there are contamination problems in the future, the state
will have to prosecute the Source Site Owner (if possible) or use government funding to
remediate the Source Site and the Main Street Site.
Lessons Learned
This case study offers many lessons that are different from the Birch Island case. The
major differences stem from the buyer's form of entity and the product type. Unlike
American Residential Development, this case study involves a buyer that is a publicly traded
real estate investment trust. Also, unlike the residential land development that occurred on
Birch Island, this project involved prime office properties and a parcel of land suitable for
future development. Below are some of the major "lessons learned" through the Main Street
Site acquisition.
From the very first conversation with the Seller, the REIT stated that it had no
intention of using the contamination issue to lower the purchase price during ongoing
negotiations. Once the purchase price was established and agreed upon by both parties, it
would remain fixed. The REIT strongly believed this was the only way to earn the "trust" of
the Seller and build a strong relationship. In a transaction that involves contamination issues,
parties begin to question the true goals of their counterparts. By sticking to its promises, the
REIT gained the Seller's complete trust.
The issue of trust went beyond the fixed transaction price. Since there are very few
"black and white" answers during a brownfields project, the parties had to work on a
cooperative strategy throughout the deal. If there were a lack of trust among the parties, each
side would have questioned the other side at every stage of negotiations. For example, all of
the documents that were negotiated hinged on one specific clause--the control of the escrow
funds were at the "Buyer's discretion." The REIT was able to forge a strong relationship with
the Seller by not exercising its right to take over the escrow account and the remediation
process from the start.
As mentioned throughout the case study, one of the major risks to the Seller was that
the consideration or total number of Units was decreasing due to the rising market. The higher
the "average price" was, the fewer OP Units for the Seller at closing. With all of this in mind,
the Seller should have been aware that it was in its best interest to consummate this transaction
as quickly as possible. Although not directly a brownfields issue, the motivation of a seller to
conduct a transaction with a REIT in a short timeframe could provide the REIT with
tremendous leverage while negotiating the brownfields issues.
Also, the fact that the Seller was actually a number of limited partnerships could have
stalled the deal. When buying a contaminated parcel, the buyer must know who will be
responsible for remediation costs and legal problems post closing. By establishing an escrow
account with proceeds from the sale, the REIT eliminated the risk of the Seller dissolving after
the sale. Furthermore, it established the escrow account in such a way as to motivate the
Seller to perform their required duties.
Finally, like most brownfields investors, the REIT planned to take full advantage of
the available state voluntary remediation program. The Remediation Plan was subject to the
reasonable approval of the Buyer and the Buyer had no obligation to approve any plan that
was not under the State Voluntary Remediation Program (VRP). The VRP had the advantage
of providing finite closure certification upon completion of the remediation and helped to
protect the registered owner(s) from any interim litigation, citations, or claims.
Chapter 5
Lessons Learned
As mentioned earlier, I will utilize the case studies conducted by my teammates
throughout this chapter. The collection of six case studies should provide for appropriate
comparisons and contrasts. While conducting the case studies, we were exposed to four
different states, four different end uses (e.g., industrial, office, recreational, and residential),
and many different types of principals (e.g., government, private, public REIT). I will begin
with a brief description of the other brownfields projects, and then use the entire cache of deals
to extract some lessons learned.
Case Studies
An Industrial Manufacturer 3 5
A former manufacturing facility was redeveloped into a state-of-the-art warehouse and
distribution center. The site, which was listed on CERCLIS, had both the presence and stigma
associated with groundwater contamination and a sludge bed on the site. The investor
redeveloped the site as an owner/operator enabling it to manage much of the redevelopment
risk. The principal challenges that stood in the way of the deal were purchaser liability,
minimizing remediation cost, and resolving back taxes assessed to the site. The transaction
documents that played a key role were: the purchase and sale agreement, covenants not to sue,
comfort letters, deed restrictions, and a remedial action plan. Furthermore, a "risk based
corrective action" approach was utilized to breathe life back into this unproductive site.
Health Center 36
3 Evans, John M. "Risk Sharing in Brownfields Redevelopment: a case study approach," Master Thesis,
MIT Center for Real Estate, 1997.
A laboratory, which was engaged in the manufacturing of vacuum tubes, x-ray tubes,
and other electronic components, was sold by its parent company, but the sale expressly
excluded the firm's facilities and land. The property, which consisted of 12.7 acres, had
several areas of soil and groundwater contamination. The seller was a well-capitalized
manufacturing firm located in the Northeast. It retained control of the site due to the site's
environmental problems and its own potential liability exposure. Despite remediation efforts
by the seller, the state DEP was slow to review the site and to issue "no further action" letters.
This delay was the result of limited DEP staff and the absence of any formalized remediation
standards until many years later.
A potential buyer wanted to build a recreation center at the site. This buyer was
concerned primarily with the containment of costs, shelter from environmental liability, and a
predictable approval process. In negotiating the relationship between the buyer and the Seller,
this case offered strong examples of the role the seller may play in adding value to an impaired
property.
Swiss Bank Corporation 37
In 1994, Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) executed agreements with the City of
Stamford and the State of Connecticut providing for the relocation of their 575,000 square foot
North American operations. The site, which was created through the assemblage of 32 lots,
was found to have widespread contamination. Ultimately what convinced SBC to accept this
site was a negotiated agreement between the Bank, the State, and the City. A detailed
36 Ibid.
3 Ryan, Shaun. "Brownfields Development," Master Thesis, MIT Center for Real Estate, 1997.
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) held each party to various commitments. Without
the successfully negotiated MOU, the deal would almost certainly have been lost.
Another important requirement of the SBC was that the title of the entire property be
held by a government entity, the Urban Redevelopment Commission (URC), until the
remediation was complete and the "Covenant Not to Sue" was issued by the DEP. By
avoiding the title chain until the last minute, the Bank avoided any unnecessary environmental
liability.
10 Trafalger Junction Road 38
In 1994, a group of experienced investors pooled some funds together and formed a
company for the sole purpose of acquiring a contaminated property in Massachusetts. Their
goal was to rehabilitate the property so that it could once again be marketed and sold as a light
manufacturing facility. A complex and precisely timed series of events was required to
overcome the significant financial and legal obstacles associated with the site. These events
included: purchasing the first mortgage position from the bank, conducting detailed on-site
contamination investigations, buying the shares of the original debtor corporation, taking that
company through voluntary bankruptcy, battling with the town for tax abatement, and finally,
obtaining Federal and State sign off documents. The property had been abandoned for almost
ten years and it seemed economically unfeasible to all that had bothered to look at it. Thus,
this is a case in which the investor's specific expertise in the brownfield redevelopment
process had added significant value by dramatically reducing the risks.
Major Hurdles
38 Ibid.
Land assemblage
In some instances, many brownfields need to be assembled to create one economically
feasible parcel. For a myriad of reasons, it is very difficult for an individual investor to
attempt to conduct the assemblage without assistance from a government entity. First, as a
private investor, one does not have the powers of eminent domain. Second, because the
investor must purchase the lots individually, the owners of the last few lots typically present a
problem. They realize that their lot is essential to the project, and as such, they deem its value
must be greater than market value. However, these issues can be resolved with assistance
from state legislative measures.
The state does have the ability under law to take the individual lots and pay fair market
value to their owners. If the individual contaminated lots will remain in their current state of
environmental disrepair due to their small size, then the state might agree to assemble the site
on behalf of an investor whose plans include remediation and redevelopment. In the context
of this thesis, it is important to recognize that the state assistance resulted in lower project
costs and less risk for the investors.
This is exactly what happened with the Swiss Bank project in Stamford, Connecticut.
The State assembled a 12-acre parcel through the acquisition of 32 individual lots. If the State
of Connecticut did not conduct this assemblage, the lots would remain contaminated today.
Instead, the Swiss Bank Corporation is currently developing their new North American
headquarters at the location. The project promises to create 350 new jobs during the
construction period and 3,000 permanent jobs by 2008.'9
3Ibid.
This maneuver by the State of Connecticut allowed the Swiss Bank Corporation to
shift many of its risks over to the state. Although not solely a brownfields issue, the risk of
site assemblage is huge. With the State in control of the process, Swiss Bank did not have to
assume this risk. Another important risk shifting mechanism was used by SBC. It would not
take title to the property until the remediation was complete and the "Covenant Not to Sue"
was issued by the DEP. By avoiding the chain of title until the end, the deep-pocketed
corporation avoided unnecessary environmental liability.
Back taxes
Since most brownfields have been inactive for a long period of time, many face
problems with back taxes owed to the local municipality. Not to be taken lightly, these taxes
can render a project to be economically unfeasible before it begins. The major problem is that
in many states, it is unconstitutional for property taxes to be forgiven by the municipality. To
resolve this issue, brownfields investors must be creative.
In the Industrial Manufacturer case, the property was saddled with $330,000 in prior
taxes. The town allowed the investors to deed 6.6 uncontaminated acres over as payment (the
land was valued at $50,000 per acre.) The investors then purchased the land back from the
Town for $330,000, which would be paid in 20 quarterly payments over a five year period.
This approach allowed the investors to satisfy the debt and eliminate their exposure to the
back taxes without eroding the project's profit margin.40
In a separate case, the potential investors of Trafalger Junction Road were faced with
satisfying $1,800,000 in back taxes. Since State law prevented the town from reducing the tax
bill, the investors needed to find a creative solution to this hurdle. The investors paid $5,000
40 Evans.
to buy the corporation that owned and at one time utilized the site to operate a foam
manufacturing plant. Next, the investors voluntarily put the corporation through chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings. Although the town could not voluntarily revalue the property and
reduce the accrued taxes, a bankruptcy court could force a "compromised judgement." After
one and one half years of negotiating, the town not only accepted $300,000 payable over five
years, but also agreed to an abatement of taxes which would expire after five years.4 '
Insurance
It is interesting to note that none of the investors in the six case studies utilized
insurance to cap the costs of remediation, and only one investor used insurance to protect
against future contamination and third party liability (Trafalger Junction Road). As mentioned
earlier, environmental insurance can play a significant role in the redevelopment and
transferability of contaminated properties. Most investors stated that if the contamination was
quantifiable and able to be remediated, they did not perceive a need for insurance to protect
against cost overruns. In addition, remediation contractors were self-insured in case of
negligence on their part. As the "better" brownfields are redeveloped and cease to be
available, it will be interesting to see how this changes. Will future investors utilize insurance
when a site's contamination is not quantifiable or will these sites be left to lie fallow? In
addition, how will the insurers react to this "adverse selection," where only the riskier projects
are insured?
One reason for the lack of environmental insurance could be the cost. Although the
price of environmental insurance policies has decreased lately, the cost can still eliminate a
41 Ryan.
project's profit margin. Since most investors form new entities that have few assets (e.g.,
Birch Island, the Industrial Manufacturer, Health Center, and Trafalger Junction Road), the
investors do have the option of walking from a project if remediation costs are prohibitive.
Although this seems extreme, none the less, it is an option.
Government
It should come as no surprise that all six projects utilized state voluntary remediation
programs. Once again, the idea behind the voluntary remediation programs is that a third
party should be granted protection from liability if they: remediate a site to the satisfaction of
the state; avoid perpetuating the contamination of the site; and avoid causing contamination on
the site with a new use. The lessons that can be pulled together from the cases revolve around
the different experiences each one encountered while using the state program.
Unfortunately, some state DEP offices are still acting like the EPA did under
CERCLA. Instead of assisting brownfields investors, they try to hold the new individuals
responsible for past contamination and previous debt. The issue of back taxes mentioned
earlier is a good example. State and local government should be concerned with correcting
the contamination problems and placing properties back on the current tax rolls. Instead, laws
prohibit the municipalities from assisting the brownfields investors. Also, when the Health
Center project first began, it faced many delays due to a limited staff at the state DEP and the
absence of any formalized remediation standards at the time. Many states have corrected
these problems as evidenced by the important role that was played by the DEP in the Swiss
Bank project. Where the state falls on the learning curve is vital to a brownfields investor.
The states with the better programs can make the process easier for the investors and they can
add great value to the project.
Investors
While conducting the case study research, we encountered many "types" of principals.
This section will look at these types, and begin to explain how the differences affected the
negotiations of risk sharing and/or risk shifting.
Deep Pocket vs. Undercapitalized
The main distinction that was discovered focused on the principals' available
resources. In each case study it was important to determine whom had the deepest pockets,
and, as such, what types of continuing protection were extracted from the other parties. For
example, when negotiating the purchase and sale document, the seller of the Health Center site
included clauses that enhanced its flexibility to deal with future contamination on the site.
Since few brownfields are ever restored to a completely pristine site, the seller will remain
responsible for future liability under CERCLA. Therefore, the seller wanted to control the
method and degree of potential remediation in order to contain costs. One way the Seller
achieved this was by restricting the buyer's ability to assign or sell its interests without first
obtaining the consent of the seller. As a further form of protection, the seller had the ability to
terminate the transaction if the remediation costs exceeded $250,000. Had this happened, it
may have "warehoused" the site. The key point is that deep pocketed principals will remain
"in the deal" forever due to future liability, and therefore, they want to remain "in control"
forever.
In a similar situation, the buyer of the Main Street Site was a well-capitalized REIT.
As such, it could not rely upon the seller and/or the potentially responsible party to cover any
future remediation efforts. As mentioned earlier, the Buyer was concerned that the Seller was
actually a collection of numerous limited partnerships. Fearing that the limited partnerships
would dissolve after the Closing, an escrow account was established to cover remediation
expenses. By establishing an escrow account with proceeds from the sale, the REIT
eliminated the risk of the Seller dissolving after the sale. Furthermore, since it utilized the
state voluntary remediation program, the REIT had a defined standard of remediation required
that would cap their future liability.
The "deep pockets" of a principal can also affect the actions of the project's other
participants. In the Health Center case where the seller was well capitalized, the buyer opted
to not pay for a "Covenant Not to Sue." They deemed the fees charged (approximately
$50,000) were too high for the protection they would receive. Since the seller would be
responsible for any new discoveries or stricter legislation, they decided to avoid paying the
fees.
Hold vs. Flip
Brownfields investors can further be divided into two groups; those that will hold the
asset for a long period, and those that will flip the asset in a short time frame. When an
investor redevelops a brownfield for its own use, it eliminates the project's marketing risks.
For example, the Swiss Bank redeveloped its site as an owner/operator enabling it to manage
much of the redevelopment risk. Unlike American Residential, SBC did not have to worry
initially about any stigma attached to the site. However, one risk that needed to be assessed by
SBC was that, at some point in the future, it would no longer have a need for the property.
When this happens, SBC may encounter opposition from the marketplace due to
environmental stigma.
American's purpose was to create residential lots that would be sold to homebuilders
and homeowners. Although it had experience in the market, American faced considerable
marketing risk on Birch Island. There were no comparable projects for O'Connor to study
and attempt to understand how the market would react to its product. Since some of the lots
were unofficially pre-sold to the Town of Birch Island, American was willing to assume this
risk of marketing the remaining lots. The first few sales covered the project's initial costs and
the remaining sales would help contribute to the project's profit margin. Finally, because the
seller provided American with non-recourse financing, American had the option of handing
the project over to the seller if marketing efforts were weak.
Future of brownfields investing
Throughout all of the discussions regarding brownfields redevelopment, people must
not lose sight of the fact that these brownfields are still real estate. Many of the basics of real
estate development, like "location, location, location," still hold true. Some very sophisticated
real estate investors insist that private investors will actually redevelop only a small fraction of
brownfields. Many of the choice sites will be redeveloped without government intervention
due to their strong locations. For example, the Main Street Site was located in such a prime
location and in such a strong market that government incentives such as tax abatements were
not needed.
However, as the "cherries are picked" from the available pool of brownfields, more
government intervention will be needed to spur redevelopment activities. As mentioned
earlier, back taxes present a serious obstacle to these redevelopment projects. All levels of
government must band together to resolve this impediment. Furthermore, environmental tax
credits can be utilized to help brownfields investors attract equity capital. The success of both
the low-income housing tax credit program and the historic rehabilitation tax credit program
have paved the way for future environmental tax credit initiatives. As the choice brownfields
slowly dissipate, more government intervention will be needed to lower investor's risk so that
the project can be justified on a risk and reward basis.
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